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FOREWORD
The 2018 National Defense Strategy admonishes the
Department of Defense (DoD) to invest in the continued development and integration of cyber capabilities into joint military operations. In this monograph,
Mr. Jeffrey Caton examines the current paradigm of
how the service cyberspace component commands
operate as a mixture of common joint practices and
service-unique means and methods. His research was
completed in September 2017; thus, it does not address
the May 2018 elevation of U.S. Cyber Command
(USCYBERCOM) to a unified command, or that all Air
Force Cyber Command’s (AFCYBER’s) Cyber Mission
Force (CMF) teams achieved full operational capability
in 2018.
Mr. Caton argues that the properly balanced fusion
of this somewhat dissimilar force may yield a synergy
that enhances unity of effort through standardization
as well as exploits the distinct strengths of each service.
He notes that the Army has made great strides through
efforts such as the establishment of the Cyber branch
and Cyber Center of Excellence (CCoE), and he provides recommendations to build on these successes in
the areas of training, doctrine, and professional development. Further, Mr. Caton asserts that great opportunities await sage leaders who embrace the enduring
traditions of Landpower with a vision for how they
can be improved by operations in the rapidly evolving
domain of cyberspace. His work herein should inform
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the ongoing activities of USCYBERCOM as well as
individual service cyberspace organizations.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
A fundamental tenet of the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy
is to achieve and maintain cybersecurity by a joint team
effort across the whole-of-government. Some of the key
Department of Defense (DoD) members of this cyberspace team are the service component cyber commands
that report to U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM).
U.S. Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) conducts
cyberspace-related missions of which some are common
to the other service component and others are unique.
To perform efficiently and effectively as part of the
joint Cyber Mission Force (CMF), it is important for
Army leaders and policymakers to understand the
interfaces and boundaries among the service cyberspace components. Such knowledge can help to avoid
unnecessary duplication as well as provide venues for
sharing lessons learned and best practices.
The emerging DoD CMF includes forces from all
military services that may reflect artifacts in their organization, training, and operation that are influenced
by service cultures. Such diversity offers challenges
and opportunities for senior leaders and policymakers
entrusted with creating a joint force that can operate
professionally in and through cyberspace.
This monograph examines how the Army may benefit by adopting processes and practices from other service cyberspace forces to the operations of ARCYBER. It
focuses on the central question: “What is the context in
which different military services approach cyberspace
component operations internally as well as with the
DoD?” To address this question, the study is divided
into four major sections. The first section provides a
background of the mission and structure of USCYBERCOM and the tenets of current joint cyberspace
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operations doctrine. Next, the monograph explores the
mission, organization, training, and equipping of each
of the four service cyberspace components as well as the
Coast Guard contributions. The third section analyzes
how the service components support the USCYBERCOM mission as well as common trends and service
culture influences among their operations. Finally, the
author provides recommendations for DoD and Army
leaders to consider for the enhancement of joint and
service cyberspace operations.
The material presented herein is limited to unclassified and open source information available before
September 2017, thus any classified discussion must
occur within other venues. Also, the discussion regarding service cyberspace components will not be comprehensive due to classification and space requirements;
instead, the monograph uses representative examples or illustrative vignettes to guide the discourse.
The monograph includes recommendations related to
cyber training ranges, cyber professional development,
doctrine, and integration with operations in traditional
domains.

xii

IMPLICATIONS OF SERVICE CYBERSPACE
COMPONENT COMMANDS FOR
ARMY CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy states, “As a matter of
first principle, cybersecurity is a team effort within the
U.S. Federal government.”1 Some of the key Department of Defense (DoD) members of this cyberspace
team are the service component cyber commands that
report to U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM).
Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) conducts cyberspace-related missions of which some are common to
the other service component and others are unique. To
perform efficiently and effectively as part of the joint
Cyber Mission Force (CMF), it is important for Army
leaders and policymakers to understand the interfaces
and boundaries among the service cyberspace components. Such knowledge can help to avoid unnecessary
duplication as well as provide venues for sharing lessons learned and best practices.
The emerging DoD CMF includes forces from all
military services that may reflect artifacts in their organization, training, and operation that are influenced
by service cultures. Such diversity offers challenges
and opportunities for senior leaders and policymakers
entrusted with creating a joint force that can operate
professionally in and through cyberspace.
This monograph examines how the Army may benefit by adopting processes and practices from other service cyberspace forces to the operations of ARCYBER.
It is divided into four major sections. The first section
provides a background of the mission and structure
of USCYBERCOM and the tenets of current joint
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cyberspace operations (CO) doctrine. Next, the monograph explores the mission, organization, training,
and equipping of each of the four service cyberspace
components as well as the Coast Guard contributions.
The third section analyzes how the service components support the USCYBERCOM mission as well as
common trends and service culture influences among
their operations. Finally, the author provides recommendations for DoD and Army leaders to consider for
the enhancement of joint and service CO.
The material presented herein is limited to unclassified and open source information, thus any classified
discussion must occur within other venues. Also, the
discussion regarding service cyberspace components
will not be comprehensive due to classification and
space requirements; instead, the monograph uses representative examples or illustrative vignettes to guide
the discourse.
The acronyms used within this monograph are
many and refer to complex military terms. Therefore,
appendix I of this volume has been included to assist
the reader in understanding and remembering which
acronym pertains to which term.
DOD CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS
What is the context in which different military
services approach cyberspace components internally
as well as with DoD? This section explores this question in three ways. First, it presents a brief historical
background of the formation and operation of USCYBERCOM. Next, it describes the doctrinal foundations
of joint CO. Finally, it defines the common roles and
responsibilities of a service cyberspace component
command.
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United States Cyber Command
USCYBERCOM
plans,
coordinates,
integrates,
synchronizes and conducts activities to: direct the
operations and defense of specified Department of
Defense information networks and; prepare to, and when
directed, conduct full spectrum military cyberspace
operations in order to enable actions in all domains,
ensure US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and
deny the same to our adversaries.2

USCYBERCOM was initially established in June
2009 and reached full operational capability in October 2010 as a sub-unified command reporting to
United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).
The Commander, USCYBERCOM, is also dual-hatted
as the Director of the National Security Agency and
Chief, Central Security Service.3 In accordance with
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
(FY) 2017, on August 18, 2017, President Donald Trump
directed DoD to initiate the processes necessary to elevate USCYBERCOM to become a unified combatant
command.4 Details regarding the implementation of
this reorganization are still being developed. Thus, this
monograph will limit discussion to USCYBERCOM in
its roles and responsibilities prior to this change.
In his May 2017 Senate testimony, Admiral Michael
Rogers, Commander, USCYBERCOM, identified his
top mission priority as the defense of the DoD information network (DODIN), with the main threats being
those posed by state-based cyber actors. The key elements of this defense are Cyber Protection Teams
(CPTs) and the Defense Information Systems Agency as
well as “the Services, NSA [National Security Agency],
and the Defense Cyber Crime Center.”5 Also, the Joint
Staff Directorate for Command, Communications, and
3

Computer/Cyber (JS J6) is coordinating efforts with all
combatant commanders to identify “Mission Relevant
Cyberspace Terrain.”6
The CPTs working DODIN protection are but one
part of the larger CMF, which is the main operating
force for USCYBERCOM. Admiral Rogers summarizes
the focus of this capability as follows:
We [USCYBERCOM] will posture the CMF to deliver
effects across all phases of operations; to improve
operational outcomes by increasing resilience, speed,
agility, and precision; to generate operational outcomes
that support DoD strategy and priorities; to create a model
for successful Reserve and National Guard integration
in cyberspace operations; and finally to strengthen
partnerships across the government, with our allies, and
with the private sector.7

In addition to the CPTs, the CMF has mission
forces to support and protect the nation and combatant
commands in cyberspace. Cyber CMFs are comprised
of Combat Mission Teams (CMTs), Combat Support
Teams (CSTs), and CPTs, and they operate through
Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQs). Cyber National
Mission Forces are comprised of National Mission
Teams (NMTs), National Support Teams (NSTs), and
CPTs, and they operate as directed by the President to
defend against threats to the homeland.8 Collectively,
the MCF reached its initial operating capability on
October 21, 2016, with 133 teams totaling about 5,000
individuals. Officials expect to achieve full operational
capability with over 6,200 individuals by September
30, 2018.9
USCYBERCOM staff and JS J6 set the pipeline training course standards for the CMF. In January 2017,
the JS J6 completed the CMF Training Transition Plan
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that introduces “a joint training model and addresses
the Cyber Mission Force Reserve Component training demand.”10 As with other joint forces, training
standards and readiness reporting for the CMF have
been integrated into the Defense Readiness Reporting
System.11
Joint Cyberspace Operations
Joint Publication (JP) 3-12 (R), Cyberspace Operations, provides the overarching doctrine that describes
joint cyberspace organizations and missions as well as
provides guidance on the planning and execution of
CO. JP 3-12 divides these operations into three broad
categories: DODIN operations, offensive cyberspace
operations (OCO), and defensive cyberspace operations (DCO) that is further broken into DCO-Internal
Defensive Measures and DCO-Response Actions.12
Table 1 provides the definitions for these terms.
Cyberspace Operation
Type

Definition*

DoD Information
Network (DODIN)
operations

DODIN operations are actions taken to design,
build, configure, secure, operate, maintain, and
sustain DOD communications systems and networks in a way that creates and preserves data
availability, integrity, confidentiality, as well as
user/entity authentication and non-repudiation.
These include proactive actions which address the
entire DODIN, including configuration control and
patching, IA measures and user training, physical
security and secure architecture design, operation
of host-based security systems and firewalls, and
encryption of data. (p. II-3)

Offensive Cyberspace
Operations (OCO)

Cyberspace operations intended to project power
by the application of force in or through cyberspace. (p. GL-4)

Table 1. Joint Cyberspace Operations Doctrinal
Definitions13
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Cyberspace Operation
Type

Definition*

Defensive Cyberspace
Operations (DCO)

Passive and active cyberspace operations intended
to preserve the ability to utilize friendly cyberspace
capabilities and protect data, networks, net-centric
capabilities, and other designated systems. (p. II-2)

• DCO-Internal
Defensive Measures
(IDM)

• Internal defensive measures are those DCO that
are conducted within the DODIN. They include actively hunting for advanced internal threats as well
as the internal responses to these threats. (p. II-3)

• DCO-Response
Actions (RA)

• Deliberate, authorized defensive measures or activities taken outside of the defended network to
protect and defend Department of Defense cyberspace capabilities or other designated systems. (p.
GL-4)

*Definitions are excerpted from Joint Publication 3-12 (R).

Table 1. Joint Cyberspace Operations Doctrinal
Definitions (cont.)
Since joint CO are categorized by intent, JP 3-12
also describes four types of cyberspace actions that
are common to missions that require specific effects
in cyberspace: cyberspace defense; cyberspace intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; cyberspace
operational preparation of the environment; and cyberspace attack. The publication also discusses how CO
support the joint warfighting functions of command
and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, sustainment, and protection.14 JP 3-12 also offers
guidance on expanding CO to interorganizational and
multinational venues.15
To provide training, enhance proficiency, and
evolve CMF and related cyber forces, USCYBERCOM
conducts many different events including the annual
Cyber Flag and Cyber Guard exercises. Cyber Flag is “a
joint and combined military exercise focused on training and validating the CMF’s capabilities and readiness to execute all phases of conflict across defensive
6

and offensive capabilities.”16 The exercise allows CPTs
to apply their skills against cyber opposing forces as
well as provides opportunities for NMTs and CMTs
to practice OCO. Cyber Guard focuses on DODIN
operations and protection of critical infrastructure in
a compromised cyberspace environment. Its scope has
expanded over five iterations to involve state and federal government as well as allied participation.17 The
sixth annual Cyber Guard conducted in June 2017 was
co-led by USCYBERCOM, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The exercise scenario “was developed
based on [a] whole-of-nation event” and included participants from 22 countries.18
Service Cyberspace Components
From its inception, USCYBERCOM was organized
to leverage cyberspace components provided by the
Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force. Figure 1
depicts the original concept of cyberspace command
and control among USSTRATCOM, USCYBERCOM,
services, combat support agencies, and combatant
command joint forces. The January 2017 Memorandum
of Agreement between DoD and DHS clarified the
Coast Guard role for cyber operations: “For purposes
of securing, operating, and defending the [DODIN],
Coast Guard Cyber Command will be responsible to
the direction of, and report to, the Commander, U.S.
Cyber Command.”19 While the current version (2013)
of JP 3-12 provides overarching roles and responsibilities for service chiefs, it does not provide guidance on
the formation and management of their cyberspace
components, nor does it provide any mention of the
CMF.20
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Source: U.S. Department of Defense.

Figure 1. Cyberspace Command and Control
Organizational Construct21
Service components perform several common functions; each is responsible for operating a Joint Forces
Headquarters-Cyber (JFHQ-C) as well as staffing,
training, and equipping various teams of the CMF.22
8

They also have responsibilities as a cybersecurity service provider (CSSP) that relate directly to the USCYBERCOM top priority to protect DODIN:
Cybersecurity services include capabilities to implement
DoD Component activities addressing vulnerability
assessment and analysis; vulnerability management;
malware protection; continuous monitoring; incident
handling; insider threat [processes] to identify and
evaluate anomalous user activity; and warning
intelligence and AS&W [attack sensing and warning] to
protect the DODIN.23

To improve DODIN protection, Defense Information Systems Agency is partnering with the Army and
Air Force to consolidate and standardize the equipment and software necessary for network security. The
approach involves the deployment of joint regional
security stacks (JRSS) to increase visibility, efficiency,
and effectiveness of DODIN operations.24 Figure 2
provides details on how JFHG-DODIN, CMF teams,
CSSPs, and other cybersecurity organizations interface
to achieve shared situational awareness that enables
cybersecurity and DCO actions. To improve the cybersecurity of materiel solutions using the defense acquisition system, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics added Enclosure 14, “Cybersecurity in the Defense Acquisition
System” to its capstone guidance document for DoD
acquisition (DODI 5000.02) in February 2017.25

9

Source: U.S. Department of Defense.

Figure 2. Cybersecurity Integration into
DODIN Operations26
Having established an understanding of the context in which the four military service cyberspace components operate, let us now explore each of them in
their protocol order: Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and
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Air Force. This will also include a brief summary of the
Coast Guard cyberspace command.
ARMY SERVICE CYBERSPACE COMPONENT
ARCYBER was established in October 2009 and
reached full operational capability in October 2010 as
the lead Army organization for CO. In 2014, ARCYBER was designated as the Army Force Component
Headquarters to USSTRATCOM, and its commander
was dual-hatted as Commander, 2d Army that was
reactivated as the single point of contact for Army
network operations.27 In January 2017, ARCYBER’s
role as an operational-level Army force was elevated
to the status of Army service component command
to USSTRATCOM, with the provision that it would
become the ASCC to USCYBERCOM when it becomes
a unified command. At that time, the 2d Army was
disestablished and its Network Enterprise Technology
Command reassigned to ARCYBER. The Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) General Order
directing these changes also noted that:
to ensure unity of effort, the HQDA Chief Information
Officer/G-6, the HQDA Deputy Chief of Staff G-3/5/7,
and the Commander, ARCYBER will maximize
communications and information in the execution of their
missions and functions.28

To aid in this process, ARCYBER had previously established (in July 2016) a Cyber Directorate in the HQDA
G-3/5/7 office to coordinate cyberspace doctrine,
policy, organization, and resourcing.29
Headquarters ARCYBER is currently split, based
with elements at Fort Belvoir, VA, Fort Meade, MD,
and Fort Gordon, GA. Groundbreaking occurred in
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November 2016 for a new consolidated headquarters facility at Fort Gordon—with its first phase to be
completed by 2018, the second phase to support CPT
operations by 2019, and its full capability for over 2,000
personnel by 2020.30 Four Army lieutenant generals
have served as the commander of ARCYBER thus far:
Rhett A. Hernandez (October 2010 to September 2013),
Edward C. Cardon (September 2013 to October 2016),
Paul M. Nakasone (October 2016), and Stephen G. Fogarty (May 2018 to present).
Mission
United States Army Cyber Command directs and
conducts integrated electronic warfare, information and
cyberspace operations as authorized, or directed, to
ensure freedom of action in and through cyberspace and
the information environment, and to deny the same to
our adversaries.31

In his May 2017 Senate testimony, Nakasone stated
three priorities for ARCYBER:
Aggressively Operating and Defending Our Networks,
Data, and Weapons Systems; Delivering Effects against
Our Adversaries; and Designing, Building and Delivering
Integrated Capabilities for the Future Fight.32

Currently the Army assesses its network compliance
and readiness to pursue these priorities using processes that measure conformity with policy, regulation,
and law through various scorecards and inspections.
ARCYBER worked with JFHQ-DODIN to evolve its
compliance-based readiness inspections to a riskbased operational inspection that provides risk assessments for specific mission critical tasks, thus assisting
commanders in resource prioritization. ARCYBER
12

also prioritizes its basic cybersecurity hygiene requirements based in part on the visibility achieved through
the DoD Cybersecurity Scorecard process.33
One of the key concepts for the ARCYBER mission
is the Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) Support to Corps and Below (CSCB) program initiated in
2015 with four primary purposes:
Define what offensive and defensive cyber effects to
integrate at the echelon Corps and below; Determine
expeditionary Defensive Cyberspace Operations,
Offensive Cyberspace Operations, Electronic Warfare,
and Information Operations capability for deployed
tactical forces; Leverage Combat Training Centers
(CTCs) and operational deployments to inform CEMA
Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership
and Education, Personnel, and Facilities development
(DOTMLPF); and Determine the enduring CEMA
environment at CTCs.34

CSCB has supported six rotations at Army Combat
Training Centers (CTCs) since its inception, with the
most recent involving the 2d Armored Brigade Combat
Team, 1st Infantry Division, at the National Training
Center in Fort Irwin, CA. CSCB has also supported
operations at the Joint Readiness Training Center
in Fort Polk, LA, as well as exercises like Operation
DANGER FOCUS, a combined-arms, live-fire exercise
at Fort Riley, KS. At such events, ARCYBER support
may include an adversary cyber opposing force element from the 1st Information Operations Command.35
CSCB is designed to build upon the lessons learned of
these activities to refine their support methods and
processes.36
In addition to recurring DODIN and DCO tasks,
ARCYBER may also be called upon to provide specific support, which may include OCO, to combatant
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commanders. ARCYBER is the designated JFHQ-C
to support U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Northern Command. Since June 2016,
the ARCYBER commander has also served as the commander of Joint Task Force (JTF) ARES, which is “a
Joint cyber operational headquarters providing cyber
capabilities in support of US Central Command’s
counter-ISIS [Islamic State in Iraq and Syria] operations.”37 USCYBERCOM directed ARCYBER in the
lead role in JTF-ARES with the following goal:
Through the establishment of а JТF focused on countering
ISIL [Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant] in cyberspace,
USCYВERCOM will continue to create cyberspace
conditions to support the dismantling of ISIL [redacted
passage] in support of (ISO) United States Central
Command (USCENTCOM) and to disrupt ISIL’s ability
to plan and execute attacks against the United States
(US) and coalition partners while posturing for follow-on
global CO.38

Other service components as well as the Cyber
National Mission Forces also received tasks, but ARCYBER’s unique duties as JTF commander included not
only the establishment, planning, and operation of the
JTF, but also the following tasks:
Provide [redacted passage] C-ISR [intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance], and C-OPE [operational
preparation of the environment] tactics and capability
development tailored to deliver desired cyberspace
effects as developed by JTF-ARES. . . . Provide technical
development and assurance for future capabilities. .
. . Develop estimate of funding required to establish
and maintain JTF-ARES. . . . Provide risk assessment to
existing ARCYBER/JFHQ-C (Army) missions based
upon force reallocation to JTF-ARES.39
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Organization
In his October 2016 article in Army magazine, then
ARCYBER commander Lieutenant General Edward
Cardon described how units with different mission
focuses are necessary to conduct cyber operations
properly. He summarized by stating:
Unifying operational control of all Army cyberspace
forces to include appropriate signal, military intelligence
and cyberspace units is critical to operating, maintaining,
securing and defending the Army’s portions of the
combined DoD Information Network [DODIN].40

Thus, the major ARCYBER units shown in figure 3 and
described in table 2 have different focuses such as network operations, information operations, and intelligence. For the CMF, ARCYBER must provide 41 total
teams: 4 NMTs, 3 NSTs, 8 CMTs, 6 CSTs, and 20 CPTs.
As of May 2017, 33 of the Army teams were fully capable, with the remaining 8 teams projected to reach full
operational capability by the end of September 2017.
Current plans also call for an additional 21 total force
CPTs, 10 from the Army National Guard, and 10 from
the Army Reserve by 2021.41

Source: U.S. Army Cyber Command.

Figure 3. Major ARCYBER Unit Locations42
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Joint
Cyberspace
Mission Areas

Unit

Mission

Network Enterprise
Technology Command
(NETCOM)

NETCOM leads global operations for the
Army’s portion of the DODIN, ensuring
freedom of action in cyberspace while
denying the same to our adversaries
(p. 120).43

DODIN

1st Information Operations Command
(Land) provides IO and Cyberspace
Operations support to Army and other
Military Forces through:
• Deployable Support Teams
• Opposing forces support
• Reachback planning and analysis
• Specialized training

OCO

(Fort Huachuca, AZ)
1st Information
Operations (IO)
Command
(Fort Belvoir, VA)

In order to support freedom of action
in the information environment and to
deny the same to our adversaries.44
Cyber Protection Brigade
(CPB)
(Fort Gordon, GA)

780th Military Intelligence
(MI) Brigade
(Fort Meade, MD)

To rapidly evaluate and act in response
to unexpected and dynamic cyber situations; defend the nation in response
to hostile action and imminent cyber
threats; conduct global cyberspace operations to deter, disrupt, and defeat our
adversary’s cyberspace operations; and
defend the United States through specialized cyber support missions.45

DCO

The 780th Military Intelligence Brigade
conducts signals intelligence and cyberspace operations to create operational
effects in and through the cyberspace
domain to gain and maintain freedom of
action required to support the Army and
Joint requirements while denying the
same to our adversaries.46

Table 2. Major ARCYBER Units
All ARCYBER activities are monitored and controlled by the Army Cyber Operations and Integration
Center (ACOIC), an operational element of ARCYBER headquarters. It provides cyberspace situational
awareness in part through the coordination of five
regional cyber centers assigned to Europe, Southwest Asia, Pacific, Korea, and the continental United
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States.47 These regional cyber centers also serve as the
Army CSSPs, which concentrate protection against
known network threats. The Cyber Protection Brigade
(CPB) uses its cyberspace maneuver force of 20 CPTs
to conduct active reconnaissance and response actions
for more sophisticated threats. The CPB also supports
the protection of critical infrastructure of the Army as
well as infrastructure administered by the Army Corps
of Engineers, such as dams and hydroelectric plants.48
In 2014, the Army established the Cyber branch
as “a maneuver branch with the mission to conduct
defensive and offensive cyberspace operations . . . the
only branch designed to directly engage threats within
the cyberspace domain.”49 In addition, to support the
integration of electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) operations with cyber operations, the Army approved a
phased approach to convert the Electronic Warfare
(EW) occupational specialty (Functional Area [FA] 29)
to the Cyber branch (FA 17), to begin in 2018. As of
May 2017, the Army Cyber force (FA 17 and FA 29)
stands at 2,331 Soldiers: 557 officers, 305 warrant officers, and 1,469 enlisted.50 However, the estimated need
for a fully operational ARCYBER is over 3,800 military
and civilians with core cyber skills.51
There are explicit cyber career fields for officers, warrant officers, and enlisted personnel within the Cyber
branch; together these comprise the core of the Army
cyber force. The Cyber Operations Officer’s (17A) primary purpose is to “lead, plan, and direct both defensive and offensive cyberspace maneuvers and effects
operations in and through the cyberspace domain.”52
The warrant officer position of Cyber Operations Technician (170A) performs as an advisor to command staffs
regarding the use of CO assets and personnel and “integrates cyberspace effects into warfighting functions in
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an effort to optimize combat effectiveness.”53 Enlisted
members can perform as a Cyber Operations Specialist
(17C) with duties that cover the range of CO, as well as
a Cyber Network Defender (25D) with duties focused
on DCO.54 CO may also involve several other related
career fields in the areas of network operations, cryptology, signals, and intelligence. Appendix II describes
position descriptions and duties.
In January 2017, the Army initiated a cyberspaceeffects career program for civilians as well to add expertise to the cyber force that is not found in existing military training courses.55 The new career field “will unify
all Cyberspace Effects civilian employees into a single
cross-disciplinary model for training and management
of multiple Occupational Specialties.”56 The program
will also align Cyberspace Effects civilians with FA17
officer counterparts, thus they will be subject to the
same USCYBERCOM joint training requirements.
To address the challenge of recruiting cyberspace-related personnel in a highly competitive job
market, the Army is implementing direct commissioning (lateral entrance into force) aimed at skill sets such
as “computer programming, mathematics, network
operations, cryptology, data science, or nanotechnology.”57 Also, the Army will continue to leverage expertise from industry and other sectors via the total force
concept. To support such efforts, the reorganization
of Army Reserve Information Operations Command
to Army Reserve Cyberspace Operations Group was
implemented in October 2016.58 Army Reserve Cyberspace Operations Group current plans are to have 10
Reserve CPTs by 2021.59
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Training
ARCYBER conducts its CMF training in individual,
collective, and mission rehearsal courses and events.60
In 2015, the Army proponent of CO shifted from
ARCYBER to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command with its establishment of the U.S. Army
Cyber Center of Excellence (CCoE) at Fort Gordon,
GA. Thus, the CCoE became “the Army’s center of
gravity for institutionalizing cyberspace, to include
developing the necessary doctrinal, organizational,
training, and materiel activities and policies.”61 Moreover, the CCoE will help to evolve and integrate Army
cyberspace, EW, and signal operations into joint force
requirements.62
For individual training focused on building core
CO knowledge and competencies, the CCoE’s Army
Cyber School executes programs that meet ARCYBER requirements, which include joint standards of
USCYBERCOM J7.63 Introductory Army Cyber School
courses include the Basic Officers Leader Course,
the warrant officer training program with basic and
advanced courses, and the enlisted Advanced Individual Training, which has its first phase as the Navy Joint
Cyber Analysis Course (JCAC) at Pensacola, FL.64 The
first CCoE classes for Cyber branch lieutenants were
completed in May 2016, and in March 2017 for warrant
officers and enlisted personnel. A total of 583 Cyber
branch members were trained in FY 2016 and 1,200
additional students are scheduled for FY 2017.65
Collective CO training utilizes ARCYBER and
CCoE capabilities that provide “simulated, virtual,
and real-world operational events on ranges and networks that stress individual and team capabilities.”66
During FY 2017, Army CMF teams were scheduled for
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about 80 collective training events, including Cyber
Guard and Cyber Flag as well as plans for 48 internal
mission rehearsal events. These activities may involve
joint, interagency, and partner nation participation,
thus making such training a crucial means for building team proficiencies and preparing for actual CO
missions.67
After several years of development, Field Manual
(FM) 3-12, Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations,
was released in April 2017 as an expansion of, and
replacement for, FM 3-38, Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (February 2014). FM 3-12 strives to consolidate CO,
EW, and CEMA fundamentals and guidance into one
document as well as to provide a coherent paradigm
of how these capabilities enable Army operations. Its
definitions and discussion of CO missions are consistent with JP 3-12 and mark the starting point of broader
treatise not only of EW but also on EMS operations and
spectrum management. FM 3-12 also addresses the
relationships CO and EW have with information operations, intelligence, space operations, and targeting.
Figure 4 depicts how CO and EW missions and actions
interface internal to and external to the DODIN.68 FM
3-12 does a good job of explaining the basics of CO and
EW, including how these operations are integrated
into military planning processes. However, it does a
very poor job of articulating the Army’s role in joint
CO; it is devoid of any explicit reference to the CMF
or any of its teams or the myriad responsibilities of
ARCYBER as an ASCC.
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Source: U.S. Army.

Figure 4. Army Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare
Operations—Missions and Actions69
Equipping
ARCYBER is supporting several efforts toward the
Army Network Modernization to include such efforts
as JRSS migration and other upgrades, some in partnership with the Defense Information Systems Agency and
the Air Force.70 The envisioned end state is to achieve
improved “cybersecurity by collapsing networks,
reducing their attack surface area, improving bandwidth and reliability, and upgrading defense capabilities.”71 The Army is also leveraging less conventional
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expertise and resources from organizations like the
U.S. Digital Service and Defense Digital Service, which
facilitated the “Hack the Army” initiative in late 2016.
In only 22 days, 371 registered researchers targeted
Army recruiting websites and reported 118 previously
unknown vulnerabilities that could result in network
or data breaches.72
A key enabler of CMF development and refinement
is the acquisition of the Persistent Cyberspace Training Environment (PCTE). DoD designated the Army as
the acquisition lead for PCTE as well as the Executive
Agent for Cyber Training Ranges.73 PCTE will provide
individual and collective training as well as mission
rehearsal for joint and service applications at three
levels of virtual fidelity.74 The Army Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training and Instrumentation held an Industry Day for potential PCTE vendors
in November 2016, as well as one for the National
Cyber Range Complex acquisition in June 2017.75
The Army Rapid Capabilities Office is helping to
equip Army CMF teams with accelerated delivery of
capabilities for high-priority mission needs using prototyping of deployable hardware and software. Prototype DCO kits were used to support a May 2017
training rotation for the 2d Armored Brigade, 1st Infantry Division at the National Training Center.76 Since
CMF materiel needs will continue to evolve, the CCoE
is working with U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command’s Army Capabilities Integration Center
to identify science and technology needs for future
Army CO capabilities that touch on several areas of
the CEMA concept.77 The Army may pursue some of
these capabilities through the Cyber Innovation Challenge, a collaborative effort amongst ARCYBER, the
CCoE, and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
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Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. The program
forms a diverse consortium of industry, academia, and
government members and uses flexible acquisition
methods to produce prototype equipment, often from
nontraditional sources. A goal of the Cyber Innovation
Challenge is to award vendor contracts only 90 days
after a requirement is announced.78
MARINE CORPS SERVICE CYBERSPACE
COMPONENT
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace (MARFORCYBER) was initially established in October
2009, and reached full operational capability in 2013
with the first commander, Lieutenant General George
J. Flynn, dual-hatted as Commander, Marine Corps
Combat Development Command. The original plans
for the new command called for approximately 800
personnel dedicated to explicit cyberspace work.79
Subsequent commanders of MARFORCYBER served
as Marine major generals: Vincent Stewart (June 2013
to January 2015); Daniel O’Donohue (January 2015 to
September 2015); and Loretta E. Reynolds (September
2015 to present). It is of interest to note that Stewart
was selected to lead the Defense Intelligence Agency
as a Lieutenant General and was nominated to become
deputy commander of USCYBERCOM in June 2017.80
Headquarters MARFORCYBER is located at Fort
Meade, MD, with a current authorized staff of 189
Marines and 32 civilians. Groundbreaking for a new
headquarters building occurred in October 2015, with
occupancy projected by December 2017. It will remain
at Fort Meade and be located in the National Security
Agency-East Cyber Campus complex.81
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Mission
COMMARFORCYBERCOM enables full spectrum
cyberspace operations, to include the planning and
direction of Marine Corps Enterprise Network Operations
(MCEN Ops), defensive cyberspace operations (DCO) in
support of Marine Corps, Joint and Coalition Forces, and
the planning and, when authorized, direction of offensive
cyberspace operations (OCO) in support of Joint and
Coalition Forces, in order to enable freedom of action
across all warfighting domains and deny the same to
adversarial forces.82

In her May 2013 Senate testimony, Reynolds discussed her top three priorities for MARFORCYBER.
The top priority is “to secure, operate, and defend the
Marine Corps’ portion of the [DODIN], the MCEN
[Marine Corps Enterprise Network].”83 The MCEN is
part of the larger Marine Corps Cyberspace Environment, which also includes tactical networks and weapons systems information elements.84 In 2015, MCEN
transitioned from being contractor managed to being
MARFORCYBER controlled, and efforts to improve
performance and reduce vulnerability continue.85 The
second priority is “to provide ready, capable cyber
forces to USCYBERCOM” primarily through various
CMF teams that will be discussed in the next section of
this monograph. The third priority of Reynolds is “to
add cyberspace warfighting expertise to the Marine
Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF),” which is the core
warfighting structure of the Marine Corps.86
The Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century was released in
September 2016 to describe how the Marine Corps will
operate in 2025 and beyond, as well as the capabilities
required for future activities. Among the critical tasks
identified for future forces is a “Broader Concept of
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Combined/Information Warfare” which includes the
following cyberspace-related goals:
•

Keep pace with ever-changing technologies to
succeed on a battlefield where the ability to conduct
cyberspace operations is as important as the ability
to perform command and control, maneuver, or fires.

•

Continue to mature our global cyberspace operations
capabilities to include employment of Cyberspace
Protection Teams as maneuver elements.

•

Deliver cyberspace and electronic warfare fires via a
wide variety of MAGTF ground and air platforms.

•

Maintain access and control of cyberspace, the
electromagnetic spectrum, and space at decisive
times and places to achieve MAGTF objectives.87

This operating concept emphasizes the roles and
actions of information operations in the space and
cyberspace domains, but does not discuss any roles
of cyberspace forces as the supported effort. Further,
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-40.4, Marine
Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations, states:
there will be operations and capabilities that blur the line
between cyberspace operations and EW and may require
case-by-case determination when electronic warfare
and cyberspace operations are assigned separate release
authorities.88

To help address such operational seams, the Marine
Corps is developing the Cyberspace and Electronic
Warfare Coordination Cell (CEWCC) concept “to operationalize the cyberspace domain and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) as interrelated maneuver spaces
through which military advantage can be gained or
lost.”89 Two military EW officers summed up the concept in more operational terms in a 2015 Marine Corps
Gazette article: “CEWCC exists to simplify the complex
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problem of maneuver in the EMS and/or cyberspace
for the MAGTF commander . . . analogous to a fire support coordination center (FSCC).”90
The July 2017 MAGTF Information Environment
Operations Concept of Employment presents Information Environment (IE) Operations as a combination of
six operational capabilities: cyberspace, EMS, space,
influences, deception, and inform. The concept leans
forward to consider a future when DCO and OCO
authorities may extend down to the MAGTF commander and advises:
as this occurs, there must be a command and control
mechanism in place for the MIG [Marine Expeditionary
Force Information Group] and MIG COC [Combat
Operations Center] to plan and execute OCO as a type of
MAGTF fires.91

Organization
MARFORCYBER has two major subordinate commands: Marine Corps Cyberspace Operations Group
(MCCOG) and the Marine Corps Cyberspace Warfare
Group (MCCYWG). Table 3 describes their missions.
The MCCOG performs global network operations
and MCEN defense as an operational force command
apportioned to USSTRATCOM. It was established
in December 2016 when it assumed the tasks of the
former Marine Corps Network and Operations Security Center. To support its continuity of operations as
required by the DoD, MARFORCYBER developed a
plan to provide a MCCOG alternate site at the Marine
Corps Information Technology Center in Kansas City,
MO; the plan will be implemented as funding is made
available.92 The MCCYWG, often referred to as the
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Cyber Warfare Group, was activated in March 2016
with responsibilities to identify capability requirements as well as provide training, certifying, and sustaining readiness for CMF teams.93 Also, if tasked and
authorized, the Cyber Warfare Group can conduct
OCO that may include computer network exploitation
as well as cyberspace intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, and operational preparation of the
environment.94
Unit

Mission*

Joint Cyberspace
Mission Focus

Marine Corps Cyberspace Operations
Group (MCCOG)

Executes Marine Corps Department of Defense
Information Network (DODIN) Operations
and Marine Corps Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO) in order to enhance freedom
of action across warfighting domains, while
denying the efforts of adversaries to degrade
or disrupt this advantage through cyberspace.

DODIN

Organizes, trains, equips, provides administrative support, manages readiness of assigned
forces, and recommends certification and presentation of Cyber Mission Force (CMF) Teams
to U.S. Cyber Command. The MCCYWG plans
and conducts full spectrum cyberspace operations as directed by COMMARFORCYBER in
support of service, combatant command, joint,
and coalition requirements.

DCO-RA

(Marine Corps Base
Quantico, VA)
Marine Corps Cyberspace Warfare
Group (MCCYWG)
(Fort Meade, MD)

DCO

OCO

*Descriptions excerpted from the official website of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Cyberspace
Command.

Table 3. Major MARFORCYBER Units95
MARFORCYBER contributes 13 teams to the CMF:
1 cyber NMT, 3 CMTs, 1 CST, and 8 CPTs, with 3 of
the CPTs retained and oriented toward MARFORCYBER missions. As of May 2017, 9 of the 13 tests have
reached full operational capability, with the remaining
4 teams expected to reach full operational capability
during FY 2018.96 In 2015, the JFHQ-C MARFORCYBER reached its full operational capability assigned to
support U.S. Special Operations Command planning
and operation.97 Key Marine military occupational
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specialties directly related to CO include the Cyber
Network Operations Officer (0605), warrant officer
position military occupational specialties of Cyber
Network Operations Engineer (0650), and the enlisted
military occupational specialties of Cyber Network
Operator (0651), Cyber Network Systems Chief (0651),
and Cyber Security Chief (0689). Appendix III provides
duty descriptions of these positions.
Training
During his 2010 congressional testimony, Lieutenant General Flynn noted, “a typical Cyber Marine
will require 2 years of classroom and on-the-job training to be proficient in cyberspace operations.”98 Such
training would include the the JCAC, the Joint Network Attack Course, and other DCO specialty courses,
all followed by on-the-job training. To enhance CO
proficiency and teamwork, MARFORCYBER utilizes
persistent training environments that may include
web-based training like that developed with the Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute.99 The Marine Corps also developed a cyber range
in 2015 not only to train Marine cyberspace operators,
but also some of those Marines who work with communications, intelligence, and operational planning.100
Going beyond the virtual training environment, MARFORCYBER teams also participate in training activities
such as the I MEF Large Scale Exercise 2016 held at
Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA. The exercise
included DCO support and advice from a U.S. Navy
captain.101
In October 2014, the Marine Corps released its first
cyberspace doctrine, Marine Corps Interim Publication 3-401.02, Marine Corps Cyberspace Operations. The
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document has restricted access, but the public description states that the CO doctrine addresses “how the
Marine Corps is currently organized to conduct cyberspace operations, planning considerations, and emerging changes that will affect our cyberspace operations
capability and capacity.”102 The target audience for
Marine Corps Interim Publication 3-401.02 is MAGTF
commanders and their staff. Their growing experience
with CO will feed into a refined and enduring doctrine
document in the near future. Defense industry analyst
Jared Serbu noted that this initial CO doctrine reflects
the current Marine view “that cyber capabilities
are not treated as a specialized field, but instead are
tightly integrated into Marine air-ground task forces
and managed by commanders just like any other warfighting tool.”103 Indeed, the Marine Corps vision for its
future force, Expeditionary Force 21, indicates that the
CEWCC concept geared toward MAGTF support is
an integral part of current Marine doctrine for CO and
EMS operations.104
Equipping
MCEN modernization continues with efforts to
improve its security and defense by reducing the
number of potential attack nodes and hardening those
that remain.105 Staying true to its expeditionary mission heritage, MARFORCYBER may equip its CPTs
with the Deployable Mission Support System hardware and software for DCO. This allows for a smaller
CPT element to operate from a forward-deployed location with reach-back technical support from its home
station. The Marine’s Force Design 2025 effort includes
the addition of DCO-Internal Defensive Measures companies and EW companies as elements of each MEF.106
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In 2015, Marine Commandant General Joseph
Dunford established a cyber force whose assignment
included the improvement of cyberspace capability acquisition. The result was the development of a
Cyber Advisory Team under Marine Corps Systems
Command that operates in two process time frames:
emergency acquisitions for fielding capabilities in less
than 30 days, and urgent acquisition for fielding capabilities between 30 and 180 days.107 In the summer of
2016, the Cyber Advisory Team accomplished its first
emergency acquisition that leveraged off-the-shelf
equipment to provide Marine CPTs with cybersecurity capabilities.108 The Marine Corps also leverages
industry to provide flexible and adaptive support of
its cyberspace training programs using the indefinite
delivery, indefinite quantity contracting process; three
such contracts worth almost $48 million were awarded
in December 2016.109
NAVY SERVICE CYBERSPACE COMPONENT
U.S. Fleet Cyber Command (FCC or FLTCYBERCOM) was established, and U.S. 10th Fleet was recommissioned in January 2010, with Vice Admiral Bernard
J. McCullough III as commander of both units, sometimes identified as FCC/C10F. Headquarters for both
commands were created at Fort Meade, MD, in part
to utilize the infrastructure of the Naval Network
Warfare Command located there. Tenth Fleet previously operated from 1941 to 1945 as the Navy lead for
anti-submarine warfare; the command deactivated
with the end of World War II.110 In his September 2010
congressional testimony, McCullough noted that the
responsibilities of FLTCYBERCOM went beyond those
of other service cyberspace components, acting as the
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Navy’s “central authority for networks, cryptology,
signals intelligence, information operations, cyber,
electronic warfare and space in support of forces afloat
and ashore.”111 As such, the commander, FLTCYBERCOM reports directly to the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO). Subsequent FCC/C10F commanders (all Vice
Admiral) were: Michael S. Rogers (September 2011April 2014); Jan E. Tighe (April 2014-July 2016); and
Michael M. Gilday (July 2016-present). Rogers went
directly from this command to become commander of
USCYBERCOM.
With FLTCYBERCOM entrusted to maintain,
defend, and operate the Navy’s networks, the Naval
Information Forces Command (NAVIFOR) accomplishes the tasks of organizing, training, and equipping
cyberspace forces. Until 2016, NAVIFOR was known
as the Naval Information Dominance Force, which
was established in 2014 with a mission that included
“providing combat-ready information warfare forces,
which are forward deployable, fully trained, properly manned, capably equipped, always ready, well
maintained and combat sustainable.”112 To provide
cyberspace expertise to the headquarters staff, in 2015
the CNO established the Navy Cybersecurity Division within the Navy N2/N6 and tasked it to oversee
cybersecurity strategy and policy compliance as well
as advocate for related requirements.113
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Mission
The mission statement of FLTCYBERCOM is:
The mission of Fleet Cyber Command is to serve as central
operational authority for networks, cryptologic/signals
intelligence, information operations, cyber, electronic
warfare, and space capabilities in support of forces afloat
and ashore; to direct Navy cyberspace operations globally
to deter and defeat aggression and to ensure freedom
of action to achieve military objectives in and through
cyberspace; to organize and direct Navy cryptologic
operations worldwide and support information
operations and space planning and operations, as
directed; to execute cyber missions as directed; to direct,
operate, maintain, secure, and defend the Navy’s portion
of the Department of Defense Information Networks
[DODIN]; to deliver integrated cyber, information
operations, cryptologic, and space capabilities; to deliver
a global Navy cyber common operational picture; to
develop, coordinate, assess, and prioritize Navy cyber,
cryptologic/signals intelligence, space, information
operations, and electronic warfare requirements; to assess
Navy cyber readiness; and to exercise administrative and
operational control of assigned forces.114

Whereas, the mission statement of U.S. Tenth Fleet is:
The mission of Tenth fleet is to serve as the Numbered
Fleet for Fleet Cyber Command and exercise operational
control of assigned Naval forces; to coordinate with other
naval, coalition and Joint Task Forces to execute the
full spectrum of cyber, electronic warfare, information
operations and signal intelligence capabilities and
missions across the cyber, electromagnetic and space
domains.115

In his May 2015 Senate testimony, Gilday identified
five strategic goals for FLTCYBERCOM:
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1. Operate the Networks as a Warfighting Platform.
2. Conduct Tailored Signals Intelligence.
3. Deliver Warfighting Effects Through Cyberspace.
4. Create Shared Cyber Situational Awareness.
5. Establish and mature [the] Navy’s Cyber Mission
Forces.116

These goals apply to a daunting Navy network that
includes “more than 500,000 end user devices; an estimated 75,000 network devices (e.g., servers, domain
controllers); and approximately 45,000 applications
and systems across three security enclaves,” all within
the cyberspace domain.117
One of the most formative events for FLTCYBERCOM was Operation ROLLING TIDE, which
was the response to an adversary intrusion into the
Navy’s unclassified networks and command and
control capabilities. Conducted from August 2013 to
February 2014, Operation ROLLING TIDE was the
Navy’s “first named operation launched specifically
to counter cyber activity,” and it redefined how the
Navy approached network defense and cyber threat
response.118 This “shot-across-the-bow” in cyberspace
led Navy leadership to form the aptly named Task
Force Cyber Awakening (TFCA), a year-long effort to
baseline Navy cybersecurity and the organizational
structures that develop and support it. Organized into
four task groups that examined capabilities, hardening, cybersecurity, and technical standards, the results
of TFCA informed the current structure and operation
of FLTCYBERCOM.119
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Organization

Network Defense

Network Operations

The scope of FLTCYBERCOM is impressive, with
an operational force of 16,500 active duty, reserve component, and civilians across 24 active commands and
32 reserve commands. Table 4 lists the 18 units that
reported directly to FLTCYBERCOM as of August
2017. Because of its diverse responsibilities, only about
35 percent of FLTCYBERCOM operational forces
directly conduct CO missions.120 Operations under 10th
Fleet are structured as a typical Navy Task Force that
are task organized into several mission areas: network
operations, network defense, information operations,
fleet and theater operations, research and development, and cryptologic support.121
Unit

Mission

Naval Network Warfare
Command (NETWARCOM)
(Suffolk, VA)

Execute tactical-level command and control to direct, operate, maintain, and
secure Navy communications and network systems for Department of Defense
Information Networks; leverage Joint
Space capabilities for Navy and Joint
Operations.122

Naval Communications and
Telecommunications Area
Master Station (NCTAMS)
PAC
NCTAMS LANT

Delivers and defends responsive, resilient,
and secure computer and telecommunications systems, providing information
superiority for global maritime and joint
forces.123

Naval Satellite Operations
Center (NAVSOC)
(Point Magu, CA)

. . . responsible for managing, operating
and maintaining assigned satellite systems
to provide reliable satellite services to the
joint warfighter in support of naval and
national requirements.124

Navy Cyber Defense Operations
Command (NCDOC)
(Suffolk, VA)

Execute Defensive Cyberspace Operations.
Enable global power projection through
proactive network defense [serves as the
Navy’s CSSP].125

Navy Information Operations
Command (NIOC)
(Pensacola, FL)

. . . execute cyberspace operations and
SIGINT tasks in support of naval and joint
forces and national tasking authorities.126

Table 4. Major FLTCYBERCOM
Cyberspace-Related Units 127
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Mission

NIOC Norfolk

. . . advances Information Operations war
fighting capabilities for Naval and Joint
Forces by providing operationally focused
training and planning support; developing
doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures; advocating requirements in support
of future effects-based warfare; and managing functional data for Information
Operations.128

NIOC Texas
NIOC Georgia
NIOC Hawaii
NIOC Colorado
NIOC Bahrain
NIOC Yokosuka

Conduct SIGINT, cyber and information
operations for Fleet, Joint and National
Commanders, which enhance the war
fighting effectiveness of our Navy and the
Nation.129

Cryptologic Warfare Group 6
(CWG-6)
(Fort Meade, MD)

Deliver Information Warfare capabilities to
the Fleet. Provide and deploy trained Sailors, expertise, and equipment to support
Signals Intelligence and Cyberspace operations for Naval and Joint Forces.130

Navy Cyber Warfare Development Group (NCWDG)
(Washington, DC)

. . . serves as the Navy’s Center for Cyber
Warfare innovation. As directed by U.S.
Fleet Cyber Command, NCWDG civilian
and military personnel discover and exploit
adversary vulnerabilities, delivering Cyber
tactics and capabilities to the U.S. Navy
using rapid prototyping and acquisition
authority.131

Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station
(NAVCOMTELSTA) Bahrain
NAVCOMTELSTA Naples,
Italy
NAVCOMTELSTA Yokosuka,
Japan

. . . provide reliable, available and secure
communications and information technology services critical to naval success in the .
. . [supported] region.132

CTF 1000

Provide cryptologic services. (Full mission
statement of this unit is not released to the
general public.)

Global Command and
Control Support

Research and
Development

Fleet and Theater
Operations

Information
Operations

Unit

Table 4. Major FLTCYBERCOM
Cyberspace-Related Units (cont.)
FLTCYBERCOM contributes 40 teams to the CMF:
4 NMTs, 3 NSTs, 8 CMTs, 5 CSTs, and 20 CPTs. As
of April 2017, 26 of the teams were at full operational
capability, with the remaining 14 projected to reach
full operational capability ahead of the October 2018
target. Plans are also in place to add 298 cyber reserve
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billets by October 2017 that are individually aligned to
augment DCO capabilities for CPTs and JFHQ-C, as
well as to support possible surge efforts. In February
2017, FLTCYBERCOM formed an interim Cyber Forward Element in Hawaii to support the maturing capabilities and capacity of its JFHQ-C that supports U.S.
Pacific Command (USPACOM). This will enable command and control of not only the Navy CMF teams of
the JFHQ-C, but also the three Air Force and two Army
CMF teams assigned to it.133
The skill specialty areas of FLTCYBERCOM personnel match the diversity of its operational organizations. The Navy established the Information
Dominance Corps in 2009 as their vehicle “to dominate
the modern information-related disciplines of intelligence, cyber, networks, space, oceanography, meteorology, and electronic warfare.”134 Enlisted ratings
within this corps that are related to CO include several in the Cryptologic Technician series: Interpretive,
Maintenance, Networks, Collection, and Technical.
Also included in the enlisted positions are Intelligence
Specialist and Information Systems Technician.
Potential CMF members also include Navy chief
warrant officers in several specialty series: 781X Information Warfare Technician, 782X Information Systems
Technician, 783X Intelligence Technician, and 784X
Cyber. Naval officers who may lead various cyberspace activities are the 1810 Cryptologic Warfare Officer and 1840 Cyber Warfare Engineer as well as 1820
Information Professional and 1830 Intelligence Officer. Appendix IV provides job descriptions for the
key Navy cyber-related personnel within the Information Dominance Corps. Despite fierce competition for
cyberspace expertise and leadership among government and industry, Gilday reported in May 2017 that
current reenlistment bonuses and supplemental pay
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measures were effective in achieving retention goals
for enlisted members and that cyberspace-related officer retention was at 93 percent.135
Training
Mandatory joint certification standards inform
current CMF training which is currently provided by
USCYBERCOM and the National Security Agency.
The Navy is working with the other services to build
joint cyber training capabilities that could serve individual and team needs.136 One of the greatest Navy
contributions to joint cyberspace training is its administration of the Joint Cyber Analysis Course (JCAC),
which is the initial training for many joint cyberspace
operators. Comprised of 10 modules that cover 25
cyber topics, JCAC “is designed to take individuals
who have minimal computer experience and make
them proficient in cyber-analysis within 6 months.”137
For team proficiency training and certification, FLTCYBERCOM leverages opportunities such as Cyber Flag;
for example, three of its CMF teams participated in the
recent Cyber Flag 17.138
To foster continuous improvement in its information dominance forces, to include cyberspace operators, NAVIFOR established the Naval Information
Warfare Development Command in 2017 “to advance
the maturing of Information Warfare, including cyberspace operations, doctrine, training, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.”139 The Naval Information
Warfare Development Command and its focus on warfighting innovation have led some to liken it to be the
“Top Gun” for information warfare. It uses high-intensity activities like its Composite Training Unit Exercises
to certify that units are ready to operate in contested
cyber environments.140 The Naval Information Warfare
37

Development Command reached initial operating
capability in March 2017, and is projected to reach full
operational capability by April 2019.141
Equipping
FLTCYBERCOM looks to the Space and Naval
Warfare Systems Command to acquire and sustain
cyberspace-related capabilities and systems. Space
and Naval Warfare Systems Command actively supports Cybersecurity Safety (CYBERSAFE), a program
that emerged from TFCA efforts that concentrate on
developing strict cybersecurity standards across Navy
networks and platforms. In 2016, Space and Naval
Warfare Systems Command finalized the first eight of
these standards that build upon those of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology.142
To adapt to the dynamic cyberspace environment,
the Navy’s Program Manager, Warfare 130, Information Assurance and Cyber Security Program Office
was established in July 2010 with a goal “to rapidly
and proactively field innovative capabilities that will
keep the Navy ahead of the cyber threat.”143 The top
programs of Program Manager, Warfare 130 include
cryptography and key management, network security,
and cyber analytics.144 Looking toward the future, the
Navy is looking to leverage automation in the form of
artificial intelligence and cognitive computing to better
understand activities inside warfighting networks.145
AIR FORCE SERVICE CYBERSPACE
COMPONENT
The U.S. Air Force was the first military service to
fully embrace CO, forming the Air Force Cyber Command (Provisional) in September 2007.146 In 2008, Air
Force Space Command was designated as the service
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lead to organize, train, and equip cyberspace forces. Air
Force Cyberspace Command (AFCYBER) and 24th Air
Force were established in August 2009, reached initial
operating capability in January 2010, and was declared
fully operational in September 2010. AFCYBER is
headquartered at Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland
and reports to Air Force Space Command, Peterson
Air Force Base, CO.147 Like other service cyberspace
components, AFCYBER is the service CSSP and operates a JFHQ-C. Unique responsibilities of the Air Force
include serving as Executive Agent for the DoD Cyber
Crime Center which includes responsibility for the
Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber Security Activities.148 There have been five AFCYBER commanders,
all major generals: Richard E. Webber (August 2009April 2011); Suzanne M. Vautrinot (April 2011-June
2013); James Kevin McLaughlin (June 2013-July 2014);
Burke Wilson (July 2014-July 2016); and Chris P. Weggeman (July 2016-present). It is of interest to note that
McLaughlin was selected to become deputy commander of USCYBERCOM in August 2014.
Mission
The 24th Air Force Commander also serves as the Service
Cyber Component Provider to United States Cyber
Command. As Air Forces Cyber (AFCYBER), its’ [sic]
mission is ‘American Airmen delivering full-spectrum,
global cyberspace capabilities and effects for our Service,
the Joint Force, and our Nation.’ Through daily cyber
tasking orders, AFCYBER directs units around the world
to conduct cyberspace operations across six Lines of
Effort; Build, Operate, Secure and Defend the Air Force
Information Network (AFIN) and directed mission
critical cyber terrain, Extend cyber capabilities to the
tactical edge of the modern battlefield and Engage the
adversary in support of combatant and air component
commanders.149
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Consistent with his fellow service cyberspace component commanders, Weggeman stated in his May
2017 Senate testimony that the defense of DoD and Air
Force networks is the number one mission of AFCYBER. The implementation of this mission includes
AFCYBER’s role as the CSSP for the Air Force Network (AFNET) as well as for the Air Force Information Network (AFIN) portion of the DODIN. He also
described three transformational initiatives that support this priority. The first is the Air Force Information
Dominance Platform, which is a network architecture
that improves performance and reliability as well as
enhances system vulnerability management and incident response. Air Force Information Dominance Platform implementation will proceed in concert with the
JRSS migration efforts led by the Defense Information
Systems Agency. The second initiative is the Cyber
Squadron Initiative to apply active cyber defense
using Cyber Mission Defense Teams that help unit
commanders mitigate risks to their critical missions.
In 2014, the 50th Space Communications Squadron
served as the successful vanguard of this program.150
The third initiative is the Cyber Resiliency of Weapons
Systems, which is a program to improve cyber resiliency to existing and new weapon system acquisition
and sustainment.151
With regard to the support of warfighter CO,
Weggeman’s Commander’s Strategic Vision stated his
top strategic priorities for AFCYBER as: “Employ
Multi-Domain and Integrated Cyberspace Capabilities
in support of Combatant and Air Force Component
Commanders.”152 AFCYBER operations follow a Cyber
Tasking Cycle process similar to that used to generate Air Tasking Orders for air operations. The 624th
Operations Center implements the process to develop
Cyber Tasking Orders that task cyberspace forces.153 To
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conduct the required CO, the Air Force has seven standard cyberspace weapons systems available that are
summarized in table 5. In July 2015, AFCYBER established the Cyberspace Multi-Domain Innovation Team
in part to better address operations in anti-access/area
denial (A2/AD) environments through the integration of CO; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and EW capabilities to deliver multi-domain
capabilities.154
Cyberspace Weapon
System Name

Description*

Cyberspace Defense
Analysis (CDA)
(17XX suffix A)

Conducts Defensive Cyberspace Operations by monitoring,
collecting, analyzing, and reporting on sensitive information
released from friendly unclassified systems, such as computer
networks, telephones, email, and USAF websites. (p. 8)

Cyber Security and
Control System (CSCS)
(17XX suffix B)

Provide 24/7 network operations and management functions
and enable key enterprise services within Air Force unclassified
and classified networks . . . [and support] defensive operations
within those Air Force networks. (p. 8)

Air Force Intranet Control (AFINC)
(17XX suffix C)

[Serves as] the top level boundary and entry point into the Air
Force Information Network (AFIN), and controls the flow of all
external and interbase traffic through standard, centrally managed gateways. The AFINC weapon system consists of 16 Gateway Suites and two Integrated Management Suites. (p. 8)

Cyberspace Vulnerability Assessment/
Hunter (CVA/Hunt)
(17XX suffix D)

Executes vulnerability, compliance, defense and non-technical
assessments, best practice reviews, penetration testing and Hunter missions on AF and DoD networks & systems. Hunter operations characterize and then eliminate threats for the purpose of
mission assurance. The weapon system can perform defensive
sorties world-wide via remote or on-site access. (pp. 8-9)

Cyber Command and
Control Mission System (C3MS)
(17XX suffix E)

[Synchronized] other AF cyber weapon systems to produce operational level effects in support of Combatant Commanders
worldwide. C3MS provides operational level Command and
Control (C2) and Situational Awareness (SA) of AF cyber forces,
networks and mission systems. C3MS enables the 24th Air Force
Commander (24 AF/CC) to develop and disseminate cyber strategies and plans, then execute and assess these plans in support of
AF and Joint warfighters. (p. 9)

Air Force Cyberspace
Defense (ACD)
(17XX suffix F)

Prevent, detect, respond to, and provide forensics of intrusions
into unclassified and classified networks. This weapon system
supports the AF Computer Emergency Response Team in fulfilling their responsibilities. (p. 9)

Network Attack System (NAS)
(17SX suffix G)

(Details of this system are not releasable to the general public)

*Descriptions are excerpted from U.S. Air Force, AFSC 17X Cyberspace Operations Officer,
Career Field Education and Training Plan.

Table 5. Air Force Cyberspace Weapon Systems155
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Organization
The major units assigned to AFCYBER are two
Cyberspace Wings and one Combat Communications
Group. Each wing has three operations groups, which
in turn have several numbered squadrons that focus
on different aspects of the overall cyberspace mission.
Table 6 lists these major units as well as their mission
statements.
Unit

Mission

Joint Cyberspace
Mission Focus

67th Cyberspace
Wing

. . . executes a full range of cyber operations including the integrated planning and employment
of military capabilities to achieve desired combat
effects across the interconnected analog and digital portion of the Battlespace-Air Force Network
Ops. Comprised of over 2,500 Airmen, civilians,
and contractors across three Operations Groups
with 31 units at 17 worldwide locations, the 67th
CW employs 5 cyberspace weapon systems conducting global network operations, defensive
cyberspace operations, and offensive cyberspace
operations in support of Air Force, Joint Force
Commander, and Combatant Commander taskings.155

DODIN, DCO,
OCO

(Joint Base San
Antonio, TX)

Major subordinate units:
26th Cyberspace Operations Group 26th Cyberspace Operations Group
67th Cyberspace Operations Group (Kelly
Field Annex, TX)
690th Cyberspace Operations Group (Joint
Base San Antonio, TX)156
688th Cyberspace
Wing
(Joint Base San
Antonio, TX)

. . . executes a diverse mission set of cyberspace
capability development, test, and assessment;
develops and validates cyber tactics; integrates
cyber into Air Force Warfare Center training
events; employs cyber protection teams to defend
priority Department of Defense networks and
systems against priority threats; and operates the
Air Force cyber and information operations formal training units.156
Major subordinate units:
38th Cyberspace Engineering Installation
Group (Tinker Air Force Base, OK)
318th Cyberspace Operations Group (Joint
Base San Antonio, TX)
688th Cyberspace Operations Group (Scott
Air Force Base, IL)157

Table 6. Major AFCYBER Units
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DCO

Unit

Mission

Joint Cyberspace
Mission Focus

5th Combat
Communications
Group

Extend tactical cyberspace capabilities at the
speed of need for the Joint Force and the Nation.
. . . The group’s two combat communications
mission squadrons and one support squadron
deploy in support of joint task force, combatant
command, and Air Force flying wing operations
and exercises. The 5 CCG also serves in an advisory capacity for two Air National Guard combat
communications groups and Air Force Reserve
Combat Communications squadrons with more
than 2,500 people in subordinate squadrons
located throughout the United States. 158

DCO

(Joint Base San
Antonio-Lackland, TX)

624th Operations
Center
(Joint Base San
Antonio-Lackland, TX)

. . . serves as the command and control element
of the 24th Air Force. Its mission is to ‘Command
and Control cyberspace forces: Operate, Defend,
and Engage.’ The 624 OC consists of four divisions: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, Combat Plans, Combat Operations, and
Strategy and reports directly to the 24th Air Force
Commander. The 624 OC receives orders and
tasks from United States Cyber Command and
in turn tasks 24th Air Force subordinate units to
perform a wide range of cyber missions in support of Air Force and joint force commanders.159

Table 6. Major AFCYBER Units (cont.)
AFCYBER contributes 39 teams to the CMF: 4
NMTs, 2 NSTs, 8 CMTs, 5 CSTs, and 20 CPTs. As of
May 2017, over 50 percent of AFCYBER teams were
at full operational capability, and the remaining teams
should be at the operational capability by the end of
FY 2018. There are also five total force CMF teams: two
Air National Guard CPTs and three Air Force Reserve
CPTs.160 AFCYBER uses a force employment methodology of cyber force packages that allow more flexibility in employment.161 Thus, the 2 Air National Guard
CPTs are manned by personnel from 12 Air National
Guard squadrons.162
The Air Force has three military personnel classifications that explicitly involve CO and thus are authorized to wear the CO badge. For officers, the cyberspace
specialties are Network Operations (17DX) and Cyber
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Warfare Operations (17SX); the specialty codes include
suffixes to indicate the specific cyber weapon systems
they operate (see Appendix V for details). Of interest
is the fact that only the 17SX suffixes include network
attack systems and OCO platforms.163 For enlisted
members, the operational specialty is Cyberspace
Warfare Operations (1B4X1). There are also several
other enlisted specialties that are authorized to wear
the cyberspace support badge; they include Cyber
Systems Operations (3D0X2), Cyber Surety (3D0X3),
Computer Systems Programming (3D0X4), and Cyber
Transport Systems (3D1X2). Appendix V provides the
job description for the Air Force cyberspace operational and support specialties.
Training
In his 2016 Cyber Defense Review article, then-AFCYBER commander Major General Ed Wilson provided a
concise summary of his command’s training process:
Today, we operate a training pipeline with Undergraduate
Cyberspace Training delivered by our Air Education and
Training Command (AETC), and weapons system Initial
Qualification Training, which is at our user command
Field Training Unit (FTU). More specialized Mission
Qualification Training is conducted either at the FTU
or the gaining unit, which complements the training
and mission certification of our intelligence specialists
inbound to our cyber units.
A critical step towards normalizing cyberspace operations
is the continued incorporation of advanced concepts in
technical training school, which better equips our Airmen
for the challenges they face in an increasingly contested
operating environment.164

44

AFCYBER crew training is a continuous and progressive process, hence the command established
a Ready Cyber Crew program to ensure operators
not only maintain their DoD certification requirements but also increase their proficiency and mission
effectiveness.165
To support this process, the 328th Weapons School
established the Cyber Weapons Instructor Course
at Nellis Air Force Base, NV, and graduated its first
class of eight cyber warfare officers in June 2012.166
The implementation of the Cyber Weapons Instructor Course is a significant step in the full integration
and normalization of CO with the more traditional Air
Force weapons training related to fighter and bomber
aircraft. Evidence of this progress can be found in the
increasing role that CO plays in capstone Air Force
combat exercises, such as the recent Red Flag 17-1 at
Nellis Air Force Base during January and February
2017. Since the first incorporation of a distributed virtual simulation capability in Red Flag 15-2 (March
2015), “the multi-domain exercise is evolving to include
more realistic scenarios by increasing the use of cyber
capabilities and other non-kinetic effects in planning
and warfighting.”167
Equipping
To support the cybersecurity and resilience of new
and existing weapons systems acquisition, the Air
Force established the Weapons Systems Cyber Resiliency program. The program adopts a multipronged
approach to achieve mission assurance, system assurance, and resilience of Air Force operations and sustainment. The Weapons Systems Cyber Resiliency
program is part of the larger Air Force Cyber Campaign
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Plan, a program with two major goals: “1) to ‘bake
in’ cyber resiliency into new weapon systems and 2)
mitigate critical vulnerabilities in fielded weapon systems.”168 The Cyber Campaign Plan is administered by
the Cyber Resiliency Office for Weapon Systems organization across seven lines of actions, and it addresses
cyber resiliency related to critical infrastructure.169
The AFCYBER Commander’s Strategic Vision includes
a strategic priority to “Equip the Force through Rapid,
Innovative Fielding of Cyber Capabilities.”170 The
Air Force Life Cycle Management Center is a partner
toward this goal through the Rapid Cyber Acquisition
and Real Time Operations and Innovation initiatives.
These programs include streamlined contract and budgeting authorities that significantly reduce the time
to procure cyberspace systems. The establishment of
the Cyber Proving Ground in 2016 provided further
resources for Air Force engineers and acquisition personnel to aid cyberspace operators in developing and
testing new systems. During 2017, the Cyber Proving
Ground helped to accelerate development and fielding of cyberspace capabilities to protect the Air Force
Satellite Control Network as well as to provide “two
unique capabilities” to support JTF-ARES.171
COAST GUARD SERVICE CYBERSPACE
COMPONENT
The mission of the United States Coast Guard Cyber
Command (CGCYBERCOM) is to identify, protect
against, and counter electromagnetic threats to the
maritime interests of the United States, provide cyber
capabilities that foster excellence in the execution of
Coast Guard operations, support DHS Cyber missions,
and serve as the Service Component Command to US
Cyber Command.172
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The U.S. Coast Guard’s Vision for Operating in the
Cyber Domain: We will ensure the security of our cyberspace,
maintain superiority over our adversaries,* and safeguard our
Nation’s critical maritime infrastructure [emphasis and
italics in original]. 173

Coast Guard Cyber Command (CGCYBERCOM)
was established at full operational capability in 2013
with operational responsibilities to both the DoD and
DHS. In 2015, CGCYBERCOM set three strategic priorities to guide its development until 2025: Defending Cyberspace, Enabling Operations, and Protecting
Infrastructure. Its operational fortes include protection
of the Maritime Transportation System and the U.S.
maritime critical infrastructure, both of which are vital
to the economic, political, and military elements of
U.S. national power. CGCYBERCOM has unique law
enforcement authorities that allow it to partner well
with DHS, the FBI, and other federal government entities as well as with foreign governments.174
With regard to its Defending Cyberspace priority, the January 2017 Memorandum of Agreement
between DoD and DHS directed that CGCYBERCOM
“will adhere to DoD cybersecurity requirements, standards, and policies,” and will be responsible for Coast
Guard-operated [DODIN] systems.175 CGCYBERCOM
does not have JFHQ-C responsibilities, but it will make
a contribution to the CMF. CGCYBERCOM formed an
initial CPT in February 2017, which is planned to comprise 39 personnel when completed in 2019. The CPT
conducted its first joint operation in May 2017 and a
squad formed in August 2017 “to perform missions
as part of DHS hunt and incident response teams for
dotgov and dotcom incidents, including industrial
control systems for national critical infrastructure.”176
To support the development of its cyberspace force, the
Coast Guard formed the Office of Cyberspace Forces
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(CG-791) in March 2017 to lead the effort to organize,
train, equip, develop operational policy, and administer programmatics.177 In May 2017, CGCYBERCOM
stood up its Battle Bridge that serves as the operations
center for Coast Guard CO. Located near Headquarters, Coast Guard in Washington, DC, the Battle Bridge
is part of the larger and distributed Coast Guard Network Operations and Security Center (NOSC) that
combines three previous network operations and
defense functions into a unified force.178
JOINT CYBERSPACE MISSION
SUPPORT COMPARISON AND FINDINGS
Having reviewed each service cyberspace component separately, let us now examine how they collectively support common missions as well as contrast
how this support may differ in certain ways. This section does not present a comprehensive analysis of all
capabilities that may support CO. Rather, it provides a
qualitative survey of several issues of interest to joint
CO. Although CGCYBERCOM provides valuable support to warfighters, we will not address their contributions in this section, since they provide less than 1
percent of the CMF and do not operate a JFHQ-C.
With the addition of the Coast Guard’s CPT, the
total active CMF stands at 134 teams. Table 7 lists the
CMF contributions of each service cyberspace component broken out by team type. The mission workload is
distributed equally among Army, Navy, and Air Force
with each having about 30 percent of the CMF and
the Marine Corps providing the other 10 percent. The
number of specific teams in each service follows the
same pattern of distribution. Collectively, CPTs comprise just over half of the teams in the CMF.
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Active Service
Component

Total
CMF
Teams

Cyber National
Mission Force

Cyber Combat
Mission Force

Army

41

Marine Corps
Navy

Cyber
Defense

NMT

NST

CMT

CST

CPT

4

3

8

6

20

13

1

0

3

1

8

40

4

3

8

5

20

Air Force

39

4

2

8

5

20

Coast Guard

1

0

0

0

0

1

Total

134

13

8

27

17

69

Total Force: National Guard (NG) and Reserve Contributions
Army NG

0

0

0

0

0

11

Army Reserve

0

0

0

0

0

10

Air NG

1

0

0

0

0

2

Air Force Reserve

0

0

0

0

0

3

Table 7. Service Contributions to Cyber
Mission Force179
All of the services are incorporating total force elements into their CO organizations. Table 7 also lists
the National Guard and Reserve teams identified by
the Army and Air Force as augmentation to the CMF.
Thus far, the Army’s teams are operated as separate
units in one state. In contrast, some Air Force teams
are built from elements of several squadrons that may
be located in different states.180 The current Navy plan
is to have 298 Reserve billets that are aligned with
specific active CPTs vice being organized as separate
teams. Assuming an average CPT size of 39 personnel,
the Navy billets are equivalent to over 7 CTPs.
CMF teams are assigned to five types of command elements within USCYBERCOM: Headquarters
Cyber National Mission Force (HQ CNMF), JFHQ-C,
JFHQ-DODIN, combatant commands, and services.
Table 8 presents the distribution of CMF teams to each
of these areas, and figure 5 portrays these elements in a
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traditional organizational hierarchy chart. Almost onefourth of the total CMF is dedicated to protect military
networks, with services retaining 24 CPTs (18 percent
of the CMF) under their command for this mission and
another 6 CPTs (5 percent of the CMF) commanded
by JFHQ-DODIN. Headquarters CNMF located at
Fort Meade, MD, controls a composite of 39 teams (29
percent of the CMF) from all services assigned to CO
related to defense of the U.S. homeland. The CNMF
also partners extensively with the National Security
Agency, DHS, the FBI, and the intelligence community.181 Collectively, combatant commands have almost
half of the CMF assigned to support them―20 CPTs
(15 percent of the CMF) under their direct command as
well as another 44 teams (33 percent of the CMF) commanded by the 4 service JFHQ-Cs. Since these forces
are joint by design, they may each contain CMF teams
from more than one service component. The assignment of combatant commands to JFHQ-C is as follows:
• JFHQ-C MARFORCYBER: U.S. Special Operations Command;
• JFHQ-C ARCYBER: U.S. Northern Command,
U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Africa Command;
• JFHQ-C FLTCYBER: U.S. Pacific Command and
U.S. Southern Command; and,
• JFHQ-C AFCYBER: U.S. European Command,
U.S. Strategic Command, and U.S. Transportation Command.182
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Organization

CMF Teams Commanded

Percent of Total
CMF

JFHQ-C

27 CMTs + 17 CSTs

33%

HQ CNMF

13 NMTs + 8 NSTs + 18 CPTs

29%

Services

24 CPTs

18%

Combatant
Commands

20 CPTs

15%

JFHQ-DODIN

6 CPTs

5%

Table 8. Command of CMF Teams in
USCYBERCOM183

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office.

Figure 5. Organizational Chart of the Leadership
Arrangement for the National Security Agency,
Central Security Service, and U.S. Cyber
Command184
The unique lexicons and operational structures that
help to define different service cultures are apparent
in several forms within the service cyberspace component commands. Table 9 summarizes some examples
of how service-unique influences manifest in their
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cyberspace components. While each service’s cyberspace doctrine is consistent with JP 3-12 tenets, different service paradigms are developed to integrate
cyberspace with other activities, such as EMS operations, space operations, EW, and IO. These paradigms
are usually designed to best support the service’s typical combat unit—for example, the Brigade Combat
Team (BCT) for the Army or MAGTF for the Marines.
Service

Service
DODIN
Segment

Core Service
Combat Structures

Cyber-related
Doctrinal
Paradigms

Army

LandWar Net

Brigade Combat
Team (BCT), Corps

CEMA, CSCB

Marine
Corps

MCEN

MAGTF

CEWCC

Navy

Navy Marine
Corps Internet

Task Force, Carrier
Strike Group

Information
Dominance

Air Force

AFNET, AFIN

Fighter or Bomber
Wing

CMIT

Table 9. Service-Unique Influences on
Cyberspace Components
All services are facing challenges in recruiting and
retaining qualified cyberspace troops, such as those
listed in table 10. Retention tools currently in use for
officers and enlisted personnel include Selective Reenlistment Bonus, Special Duty Assignment Pay, and
Assignment Incentive Pay. The DoD caps Selective
Reenlistment Bonus payments at $25,000, and Special
Duty Assignment Pay and Assignment Incentive Pay
ranged between $350 and $800 per month in FY 2015.
Although these incentives may seem expensive, they
can offset the costs of training new personnel. A 2017
Government Accountability Office report cited a service estimate of these costs to range from $23,000 to over
$500,000 depending on how much specialized training
is required.185 Another potential mitigation effort for
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the CMF staffing challenge is to incorporate more civilian positions on CMF teams. A 2016 study from the
Institute for Defense Analyses concluded that such a
change has the potential to save as much as $130 million annually without compromising DoD standards.
The study accounted for the requirement to maintain
military personnel in positions that may involve direct
participation in cyber hostilities. The Navy and Army
would have the most to gain from this change since
the Air Force and Marine Corps CMF teams already
include a significant amount of civilians.186
Officer

Warrant Officer

Enlisted

ARMY
17A Cyber Operations
Officer
(29 Electronic Warfare)

170A Cyber Operations
Technician

0605 Cyber Network Operator Officer

0650 Cyber Network
Operations Engineer

1810 Cryptologic Warfare
1820 Information Professional
1830 Intelligence
1840 Cyber Warfare Engineer

781X Information Warfare Technician
782X Information Sys
Technician
783X Intelligence Technician
784X Cyber

17C Cyber Operations Specialist
25D Cyber Network Defender
25U Signal Support Sys Specialist
35T Military Intel Sys Maintainer
35Q Cryptologic Network
Warfare Spec

MARINE CORPS
0651 Cyber Network Operator
0659 Cyber Network Systems
Chief
0681 Information Security
Technician
0689 Cyber Security Chief

NAVY
27XX Information Systems
Technician
Cryptologic Technicians (various types)
Intelligence Specialist

AIR FORCE
17C0 Cyberspace Ops Commander
17DX Network Operations
17SX Cyber Warfare Operations

Not Applicable

1B4X1 Cyberspace Warfare
Operator

Table 10. Key Service Cyberspace Personnel
Designations187
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The CMF should achieve full operational capability in FY 2018 and be ready to meet today’s needs, but
what challenges might the future CMF face? The Army
and Marine Corps are working together to develop the
concept of Multi-Domain Battle (MDB) as “an approach
for ground combat operations against a sophisticated
peer enemy threat in the 2025-2040 timeframe.”188 MDB
anticipates that future adversaries will likely “degrade
key capabilities by limiting access to space, cyberspace,
and the electromagnetic spectrum” as part of A2/AD
operations.189 Thus, MDB places greater emphasis on
CO, IO, and EMS operations to help ensure synchronization capabilities that enable effective combined
arms activities.190 In their 2017 article in Cyber Defense
Review, Lieutenant General Nakasone and Major Charlie Lewis argue that the defense of joint networks is
a foundation of MDB, noting, “fortifying the network
affords commanders opportunities in other domains
by enabling mission command.”191 They also explain
how CO can contribute to the MDB tenet of using operations in one domain to open temporary windows of
advantage in other domains. Indeed, the 2012 Joint
Operational Access Concept, which provides a vision for
the joint force to counter adversary A2/AD capabilities, states that because of this critical enabling role,
“cyberspace operations likely will commence well in
advance of other operations.”192
What cyberspace-related capabilities may be
required to help make concepts like MDB a reality?
One of the greatest limitations of using cyberspace
weapons against a sophisticated adversary is that they
may be effective only once before the foe corrects the
vulnerability exploited by the tool.193 Consequently,
it would be advantageous to have an agile acquisition process to replace the cyber “rounds” as they are
expended. The existing rapid acquisition of cyberspace
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capabilities of each service could be enabled by the
DoD test community to help ensure the effectiveness
of the weapon in a controlled cyber range. The DoD
cybersecurity test community includes facilities and
units from all services that could support such rapid
development and testing.194
RECOMMENDATIONS
The four service cyberspace component commands
that report to USCYBERCOM have less than a decade
of development and operational experience. Considering this, their collective capabilities are impressive, and
their value to joint and coalition warfighters continues
to grow as the domain of cyberspace becomes more
contested. To help guide the further progress of these
forces, please consider the following recommendations.
Recommendation 1
The Army G-3/5/7 should fully embrace the
responsibilities and opportunities related to its designation as DoD Executive Agent for Cyber Training
Ranges.
In March 2016, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert
Work designated the Secretary of the Army as the
DoD Executive Agent for Cyber Training Ranges,
who in turn delegated the task to the Army Deputy
Chief of Staff G-3/5/7.195 The implementation of this
activity will require close coordination with DoD components and the services to properly balance range
requirements, usage, and cost efficiency. Further, this
position will require cooperation and collaboration
with the DoD Director, Test Resources Management
Center, who was designated as the Executive Agent
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for DoD Cyber Test Ranges. The interaction between
the roles of these two executive agents is significant
enough that the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) has strongly recommended for years
that there be a single Executive Agent for both sets of
ranges.196
Recommendation 2
The Army should continue to develop and implement professional development courses focused on
building leaders and elite forces in the Cyber branch.
The ongoing challenges to fill critical Army cyber billets may cause a reasonable myopia toward the mere
recruitment, training, and retention of qualified candidates. However, as the fledgling Cyber branch continues to mature, it should do so with a holistic vision for
the branch that strives to keep cyber officers and noncommissioned officers on a path that not only builds
their technical prowess, but also instills the aptitudes
and values common to all Army leaders. The 2013
Army Cyber Institute publication, Professionalizing
the Army’s Cyber Officer Force,197 provides such a roadmap, albeit one developed before the Cyber branch
was established. With regard to the cyber abilities, it
may be valuable to build a course designed to create
an elite set of operators through enhanced and concentrated training. This may take the form of a Cyber
Leader course similar to Ranger school (tab and all) as
proposed in detail in the 2014 Army Cyber Institute
report, Toward a Cyber Leader Course: Not for the Weak or
Faint Hearted.198
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Recommendation 3
The DoD and the Army should implement
DOT&E recommendations to pursue a more holistic
approach to cybersecurity and network operations.
Based on 7 years of conducting operational cybersecurity assessments on DoD networks and weapons
systems, DOT&E recommended in its FY 2016 Annual
Report that “the focus of cyber defense needs to expand
beyond the traditional approaches of system protection and intrusion detection to encompass a broader
view of system resilience.”199 DCO improvements
could include less emphasis on perimeter defense and
more emphasis on detecting and mitigating anomalous
activity within the network, especially those indicative
of advanced persistent threats. One means to enable
this evolution in network defense is the use of Persistent Cyber Opposing Forces (PCO), a capability
that USPACOM used during FY 2015 to identify and
address mission critical vulnerabilities.200 The efforts
of PCO teams could be further enhanced if they were
part of an overarching and ongoing assessment plan,
such as the Cyber Assessment Master Plan method
facilitated by DOT&E. A combatant commander can
use a Cyber Assessment Master Plan to identify and
implement a 3-year plan to systematically identify and
assess their priority missions in a contested cyberspace
environment.201
Recommendation 4
The DoD and the Army should continue to leverage appropriate expertise outside the military to
augment their cyberspace planning, operation, and
capability development.
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DoD and Army leaders should recognize and accept
the pragmatic reality that keeping organic cyberspace
forces for the long term will remain very difficult in
the competitive cyberspace market. They should continue to leverage external experience through National
Guard and Reserve components as well as develop and
maintain partnerships with federal and state agencies
and departments to best utilize the resources available.
Such collaborations may extend to allies and other
international entities as appropriate. To better meet the
unique cyberspace capability materiel requirements,
cyberspace forces should take advantage of opportunities afforded by the Defense Innovation Initiative.202
Recommendation 5
Future updates of joint and Army cyberspace
doctrine should explicitly address the missions and
structures of CMF teams and JFHQ-C.
JP 3-12 was released in February 2013 when the
details of CMF composition were still being worked,
so the absence of any CMF references is understandable. However, FM 3-12 was released in April 2017 at
which time over 80 percent of the Army’s CMF teams
had reached full operational capability, yet it did not
provide any details on the their structure or use for service or joint missions. Considering the stated purposes
of FM 3-12 to include joint operations, the CCoE lost
a great opportunity to educate Army personnel writ
large on how Army CMF teams operate and how the
Army JFHQ-C supports combatant command opera
tions; these significant oversights should be made a
priority to correct.
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Recommendation 6
ARCYBER and the Cyber CoE should work with
the other service cyberspace components and the
Joint Staff to explicitly communicate and clarify how
each service is integrating CO with related activities.
It is unlikely that the services will reach consensus
regarding how the roles and responsibilities of cyberspace forces interface and interact with forces that perform information operations, EW, EMS management,
space operations, and other similar activities. Since
many CO are expected to be joint operations, it may
enhance the unity of effort for organizations such as
the various JFHQ-Cs if its members all understood the
commonalities and differences between service-unique
constructs, such as the Army CEMA and Marine Corps
CEWCC. One way to enable a better understanding of
the different paradigms that describe how these capabilities overlap is to develop a living document that
reports and compares how each service structures this
synthesis.
Recommendation 7
The Army should work deliberately to have
its leaders and Soldiers understand and regard
cyberspace activities as an integral part of combat
operations.
The FY 2016 Annual Report of the DoD DOT&E
summarizes observations from 7 years of observing
the evolution of service and joint cyberspace testing
and exercises. In this summary, they noted, “DOD personnel too often treat network defense as an administrative function, not a warfighting capability.”203 A key
symptom of this problem is the incongruity with how
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cyberspace activities are often waved off in DoD exercises, especially the “reluctance to permit debilitating
cyber attacks.” Although the situation has improved
as cyberspace forces mature in their capabilities and
proficiency, willingly allowing an exercise environment that does not model the effects expected in the
real world serves no one well. The DOT&E report
admonished that “training in a benign environment
is not acceptable in any other warfighting domain,
nor should it be for cyber.”204 Former ARCYBER commander Lieutenant General Edward Cardon reflected
in a 2016 Cyber Defense Review article on the ongoing
progress the Army is making with fully embracing the
concept of cyberspace maneuver as an integral part of
combined arms maneuver, perhaps even as the supported element in the future. Looking toward future
Army operations, he notes:
ultimately, before the synergy of maneuver across cyber
and land domains can be achieved, cyberspace operations
will need to be normalized as a regular warfighting
capability, and within a commander’s vision of the
battlefield.205

Recommendation 8
The DoD and the Army should promulgate the
exploration and characterization of cyberspace as
well as the development of theories of CO at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
While the operational structure and resources dedicated to military CO have progressed at a steady pace
since the establishment of USCYBERCOM, this progress has proceeded largely along existing doctrinal
lines. That is to say, the analysis and characterization
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of cyberspace are often forced to fit within the relatively narrow confines of paradigms based on the
physical limitations of land, sea, air, space, EMS, and
human cognition. One can argue that cyberspace is the
only domain that is ever expanding in its virtual size
and complexity and is doing so at a rate that may defy
human comprehension. Given this, the DoD and the
Army should implement the systematic and continuous mapping and analysis of the realm of cyberspace
to provide a more realistic model of its environment
and the activities that are possible within it.
This enduring exploration of cyberspace should
be guided by sound theory of the human exploitation of the domain as well as the tactical, operational,
and strategic implications.206 In turn, the results of the
exploration should inform and refine these theories.
Certainly, the process of such cyberspace investigation
and theory development may be left to the random
fortune of uncoordinated workshops, conferences, and
articles (or even monographs such as this).207 However,
given the inherent opportunities and risks that wait to
be discovered, a path of purposeful ignorance does not
serve the nation well.208
Recommendation 9
The DoD and the Army should encourage open
dialogue regarding the future evolution of military
cyberspace missions, authorities, and organizational
structures.
Even as USCYBERCOM begins its new journey as a
unified combatant command—an elevation from subunified status that is not without controversy—some
well-informed military experts assert that this may not
provide sufficient authorities for future cyberspace
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forces. In a 2014 Proceedings article, Admiral (retired)
James Stavridis and Davis Weinstein examine the
merits of creating a U.S. Cyber Force as “a stand-alone
force [that] would eliminate both the unity-of-command problem and the interservice rivalries.”209 Further, they envision this new Cyber Force to “be smaller
in size than the Marine Corps with comparatively
low physical-fitness standards and noticeably relaxed
grooming standards.”210 Since the current military
establishment may not be ready for this rather radical proposal, a more reasonable step toward improved
unity of effort in cyberspace is to establish a Joint Force
Cyberspace Component commander akin to similar
joint force component commanders for the land, maritime, and air domains.211
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The first 7 years of U.S. Cyber Command operations are paved with milestones that mark the steady
operationalization of modern cyberspace as the newest
domain of military conflict as well as a realm of international power. The creation of the CMF and JFHQ-C are
significant steps toward improving the timeliness and
effectiveness of CO that directly support combatant
commands and the whole-of-government responses to
cyberspace threats.
This monograph shows that the current paradigm
of how the service cyberspace component commands
operate is a mixture of common joint practices and service-unique means and methods. If properly balanced,
the operational fusion of this somewhat dissimilar
force may yield a synergy that enhances unity of effort
through standardization as well as exploits the distinct
strengths of each service. The Army has made great
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strides through efforts such as the establishment of the
Cyber branch and CCoE. Yet, greater opportunities
await sage leaders who can embrace the worthy traditions of Landpower while having the courage to recognize and promulgate the inevitable—and perhaps
fantastic—implications for these traditions emerging
from the rapidly evolving domain of cyberspace.
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APPENDIX I
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
A2/AD

anti-access/area denial

ACOIC

Army Cyber Operations and
Integration Center

AFCYBER

Air Force Cyber Command

AFIN

Air Force Information Network

AFNET

Air Force Network

ARCOG

Army Reserve Cyberspace
Operations Group

ARCYBER

Army Cyber Command

ASCC

Army service component
command

CCoE

U.S. Army Cyber Center of
Excellence

CEMA

Cyber Electromagnetic Activities

CEWCC

Cyberspace & Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell

CGCYBERCOM

Coast Guard Cyber Command

C-ISR

cyberspace intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

CMF

Cyber Mission Force

CMTs

Combat Mission Teams

CNMF

Cyber National Mission Force

CNO

Chief of Naval Operations

CO

cyberspace operations

COMMARFORCYBERCOM Commander, Marine Corps
Forces Cyberspace Command
CPB

Cyber Protection Brigade

CPG

Cyber Proving Ground

CPTs

Cyber Protection Teams

CROWS

Cyber Resiliency Office for
Weapons Systems

CSCB

Cyber Support to Corps and
Below
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CSSP

cybersecurity service provider

CSTs

Combat Support Teams

CTC

Army Combat Training Center

DCO

defensive cyberspace operations

DHS

Department of Homeland
Security

DISA

Defense Information Systems
Agency

DoD

Department of Defense

DODI

DoD Instruction

DODIN

DoD information network

DOT&E

Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation

ECT

Expeditionary Cyber Team

EMS

electromagnetic spectrum

EW

Electronic Warfare

FA

functional area

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FCC

Fleet Cyber Command

FCC/C10F

Fleet Cyber Command/U.S.
10th Fleet

FLTCYBERCOM

Fleet Cyber Command

FM

Field Manual

FSCC

fire support coordination center

FY

fiscal year

HQDA

Headquarters, Department of
Army

IE

Information Environment

IO

information operations

IW

information warfare

JCAC

Joint Cyber Analysis Course

JFHQ-C

Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber

JFHQs

Joint Force Headquarters

JRSS

Joint Regional Security Stack
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JS J6

Joint Staff Directorate for Command, Communications, and
Computer/Cyber

JTF

Joint Task Force

MAGTF

Marine Air Ground Task Force

MARFORCYBER

U.S. Marine Corps Forces
Cyberspace

MCCOG

Marine Corps Cyberspace
Operations Group

MCCYWG

Marine Corps Cyberspace
Warfare Group

MCEN

Marine Corps Enterprise
Network

MCEN Ops

Marine Corps Enterprise
Network Operations

MDB

Multi-Domain Battle

MI

military intelligence

MIG

Marine Expeditionary Force
Information Group

NAVCOMTELSTA

Naval Computer &
Telecommunications Station

NAVIFOR

Naval Information Forces
Command

NAVSOC

Naval Satellite Operations
Center

NCDOC

Navy Cyber Defense Operations
Command

NCTAMS

Naval Communication &
Telecommunication Area
Master Station

NCWDG

Navy Cyber Warfare
Development Group

NETCOM

Network Enterprise Technology
Command

NETWARCOM

Naval Network Warfare
Command
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NIOC

Navy Information Operations
Command

NIWDC

Naval Information Warfare
Development Command

NMT

National Mission Team

NOSC

Coast Guard Network Operations and Security Center

NST

National Support Team

OCO

offensive cyberspace operations

OPE

operational preparation of the
environment

OPFOR

opposing forces

PCTE

Persistent Cyberspace Training
Environment

PMW

Program Manager, Warfare

RCC

regional cyber center

SDAP

Special Duty Assignment Pay

SIGINT

signals intelligence

TFCA

Task Force Cyber Awakening

TRADOC

Training and Doctrine
Command

TT&P

tactics, techniques, & procedures

USCYBERCOM

U.S. Cyber Command

USPACOM

U.S. Pacific Command

USSTRATCOM

United States Strategic
Command
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APPENDIX II:
KEY ARMY CYBER-RELATED PERSONNEL
ARMY OFFICER PERSONNEL
17A - Cyber Operations Officer
Cyber branch is a maneuver branch with the mission to conduct defensive and offensive cyberspace operations (DCO and OCO). Cyber is the only branch designed to
directly engage threats within the cyberspace domain.
29A - Electronic Warfare Officer
The electronic warfare officer is the principal staff officer responsible for cyber protection and integration. This officer is responsible for conducting and coordinating
electronic attacks, facilitating electronic protection, and providing electronic warfare
support.
25A - Signal Officer
The signal officer leads the Signal Corps, which is responsible for the Army’s entire
systems of communication. Officers plan and execute all aspects of communication
on a mission and are critical to the Army’s continued success.
35 - Military Intelligence Officer
The Army’s military intelligence [MI] is responsible for all collected intelligence
during Army missions. They provide essential information that often save the Soldiers fighting on front lines.
Military Intelligence Officers specialize in these specific areas:
Imagery intelligence: Collection and analysis of imagery using photogrammetry and
terrain analysis.
All-Source intelligence: Performs collection management/surveillance/reconnaissance and provides advice.
Counterintelligence: Provides coordination and participation in counterintelligence
investigations, operations and production.
Human intelligence: Controlled collection operations and interviews.
Signals intelligence/electronic warfare: Collects signal intelligence and engages in
electronic warfare.
All-source intelligence aviator: Performs duties as an aviator/MI officer and participates in special electronic mission aircraft missions.
Job Duties:
•
Command and coordinate the military intelligence Soldiers and combined
armed forces.
•
Assess risks associated with friendly/enemy courses of action and act to
counter/neutralize intelligence threats.
•
Use intelligence systems and data to reduce uncertainty for a commander.
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ARMY WARRANT OFFICER PERSONNEL
170A - Cyber Operations Technician
Performs as the Subject Matter Expert and advisor to the Commander and staff regarding the employment of offensive and defensive cyber operations assets and personnel. Directs plans, administers, manages, integrates, and assesses cyberspace operations. Develops policy recommendations and provides technical guidance regarding the operation and management of Army, Joint, intergovernmental, interagency,
and multi-national cyberspace assets and personnel. Integrates cyberspace effects
into warfighting functions in an effort to optimize combat effectiveness. Protects the
Department of Defense Information Network against foreign and domestic threat
vectors in order to maintain network integrity and functionality. Leads, trains, and
mentors Cyber personnel through individual and group instruction, as well as the
establishment, direction, and evaluation of Standard Operating Procedures and Job
Qualification Standards.
255A - Information Services Technician
Information Services Technicians establish and maintain the ability to collect, process, store, secure, search for and discover, retrieve and disseminate information utilizing the application layer environment of the Army’s portion of the Cyberspace
domain; they enable information dissemination management/content staging in
order to perform the required information management/knowledge management
functions supporting combat information superiority and decision dominance. They
supervise and manage the systems, services and personnel in operation centers that
ensure efficient and effective caching, compiling, cataloging, retrieval and distribution of information as an element of combat power. Information services technicians
plan, install, administer, manage, maintain, operate, integrate, service, secure and
troubleshoot information systems and services to include Mission command systems
and various automation information systems enabling voice, video, data and imagery processing. They manage the training of personnel on the planning, installation,
administration, management, maintenance, operation, integration, servicing, securing and troubleshooting of information systems and services.
255N - Network Management Technician
Network Management Technicians transport the voice, video and data networks establishing and maintaining the transport layer environment of Army’s portion of the
Cyberspace domain through network management/enterprise systems management
(NM/ESM) functions to include fault management, configuration management, auditing and accountability measures, maintaining performance standards, and implementing security measures at all levels in support of combat information superiority
and command and control. They supervise and manage the operation and internetworking of telecommunications networks, network systems equipment, network
nodal transmission and transport systems, network management system platforms,
networked information systems and associated personnel at both the local area and
wide area network level. They plan, install, administer, manage, maintain, integrate,
operate, service, secure, optimize and troubleshoot communications networks and
networked systems connectivity and capacity in order to transmit information as an
element of combat power. They supervise and oversee network security planning
and the implementation and use of electronic keys and frequency management to
support communications networks and networked-systems. They manage the training of personnel on the planning, installation, administration, management, maintenance, integration, operation, servicing, securing, optimization and troubleshooting
of communications networks and networked-systems.
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ARMY WARRANT OFFICER PERSONNEL
290A - Electronic Warfare Technician
The electronic warfare specialist advises and assists the commander on electronic
warfare operations. This person makes use of electromagnetic and directed energy to
control the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) and defeat the enemy through planning,
coordination, integration, and execution of electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic support (ES).
352N - SIGINT Analysis Technician
Manages personnel and equipment to collect, process, exploit, locate, identify, analyze and report on SIGINT [signals intelligence] information to support tactical, operational, and strategic requirements across all domains. Establishes priorities and
provides guidance and oversight for collection, exploitation, analysis and reporting
missions. Manages training for subordinates and peers on technical, operational, and
tactical SIGINT skills required to perform the mission. Coordinates staff actions to
fulfill all requirements in support of SIGINT mission activities and the Commander’s
intent. Advises the commander and staff with regard to tactical and technical SIGINT
operations, activities, and personnel.
352S - Signals Collection Technician
Performs as the Subject Matter Expert (SME) and advisor to the Commander in regards to Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) collection, analysis. Manages personnel and
equipment to collect, process, locate, identify, analyze and report on SIGINT information to support tactical, operational, and strategic requirements across all domains.
Manages training for subordinates and peers on technical, operational, and tactical
SIGINT skills required to perform the mission. Coordinates staff actions to fulfill all
requirements in support of SIGINT mission activities and the Commander’s intent.
ARMY ENLISTED PERSONNEL
17C - Cyber Operations Specialist
Cyber Operations Specialists conduct integrated and synchronized offensive cyberspace operations by targeting enemy and hostile adversary activities and capabilities. These specialists also conduct defensive operations to protect data, networks,
net-centric capabilities, and other designated systems. They are responsible for detecting, identifying, and responding to attacks against friendly networks with other
lethal and nonlethal actions that enable commanders to gain an advantage in cyberspace, across all domains.
25D - Cyber Network Defender
The cyber network defender performs specialized computer network defense duties,
including infrastructure support, incident response, auditing and managing. The cyber network defender also protects against and detects unauthorized activity in the
cyberspace domain and uses a variety of tools to analyze and respond to attacks.

Table II-I. Position Title and Description of Key
Army Cyber-Related Personnel (cont.)

107

ARMY ENLISTED PERSONNEL
25U - Signal Support Systems Specialist
Signal support systems specialists are primarily responsible for working with battlefield signal support systems and terminal devices. This equipment needs to consistently work in order for the Army to direct the movement of its troops.
29E - Electronic Warfare Specialist
The electronic warfare specialist advises and assists the commander on electronic
warfare operations. This person makes use of electromagnetic and directed energy to
control the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) and defeat the enemy through planning,
coordination, integration, and execution of electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic support (ES).
35N - Signals Intelligence Analyst
A signals intelligence analyst examines foreign communications/activity and relays
that information by producing combat, strategic and tactical intelligence reports.
35P - Cryptology Linguist
A cryptologic linguist is primarily responsible for identifying foreign communications using signals equipment. Their role is crucial as the nation’s defense depends
largely on information that comes from foreign languages.
35Q - Cryptologic Network Specialist
A Cryptologic Network Warfare Specialist performs initial cryptologic digital analysis to establish target identification and operational patterns; identifies, reports, and
maintains Intelligence information in support of Commander’s Intelligence Requirements and uses technical references to analyze information.
35S - Signals Collection Analyst
The signals collector/analyst is primarily responsible for the detection, acquisition,
location and identification of foreign electronic intelligence. They exploit nonvoice
communications and other electronic signals to provide strategic/tactical intelligence.
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ENDNOTES – APPENDIX II
1. Officer and enlisted information was taken verbatim from
the specific position webpages available from http://goarmy.com/
careers-and-jobs/browse-career-and-job-categories.html, accessed September 3, 2017. Warrant officer information was taken verbatim
from the specific position webpages available from http://www.
usarec.army.mil/hq/warrant/, accessed November 1, 2018.
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APPENDIX III:
KEY MARINE CORPS CYBER-RELATED
PERSONNEL
MARINE CORP OFFICER PERSONNEL
0605 - Cyber Network Operations Officer
The Cyber Network Operations Officer develops, plans, and implements the overall tactical and strategic goals of the MAGTF [Marine
Air Ground Task Force] computer network systems. Evaluates and
recommends changes to current and future network requirements
to meet the operational needs. They are responsible for the implementation of IA, CND, and NetOps in support of cyber operations.
The duties include: providing technical and administrative support
to the commander and higher headquarters staff during the identification, resolution, and tracking of computer security incidents or
events; provide long-term and near-term CND analysis and planning for resolving systemic and enterprise computer events and/
or intrusions across the MAGTF networks; and develop, research,
publish, test and update related SOPS methodologies, and tools,
techniques and procedures. They provide liaison to the T/S-3 within the MAGTF to synchronize the activities among CND [Computer Network Defense], CNO [Computer Network Operations], CNE
[Computer Network Exploitation], and CNA [Computer Network
Attack].
MARINE CORP WARRANT OFFICER PERSONNEL
0650 - Cyber Network Operations Engineer
Cyber Network Operations Engineer Officers supervise and manage the security, planning, and operation of Information Technology (IT) Systems. With a primary focus in the functional areas of
Internet Protocol based Local and Wide Area Networks, they plan
and supervise the installation and management of IT systems. They
provide technical direction in conjunction with the overall communications control effort relating to the security, installation and
performance of IT systems within MAGTF, Joint, and coalition networks. Additionally, they provide technical guidance required to
procure and integrate enterprise IT systems in the development of
Marine Corps plans and policy for current and future operations.
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MARINE CORP ENLISTED PERSONNEL
0651 - Cyber Network Operator
Cyber Network Operators are responsible for the installation, configuring and management of cyber network systems in both stand
alone and client-server environments including Microsoft based
curriculum and MS Exchange/Server, CISCO Certified Network
Associate (CCNA) modules 1-4 as well as other authorized cyber
network systems. They install, configure and maintain cyber services, both hardware and software. They also plan and execute the
integration of multiple information systems to include Data Distribution System-Replacement/Modular (DDS-M), in a network
environment, evaluate and resolve customer information system
problems and effect hardware upgrades and repair to maintain
mission capability. Skill progression for Staff Sergeant through
Corporal is the Cyber Network Supervisor Course.
0659 - Cyber Network Systems Chief
Cyber Network Systems Chiefs perform advanced systems installation, operation, integration and troubleshooting in order to maintain optimum secure cyber communication systems. They plan
and supervise the installation, configuration and maintenance of
all cyber communication systems and network services in both a
garrison and deployment environment. Cyber Network Systems
Chiefs plan and design local and wide area networks and link heterogeneous networks through the application of appropriate cyber
and telecommunication hardware and software. Skill progression
training for Gunnery Sergeants and Staff Sergeants is the Cyber
Systems Chief Course.
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MARINE CORP ENLISTED PERSONNEL
0681 - Information Security Technician
Provide day-to-day operation of the DoN’s [Department of the
Navy] COMSEC Material Control System (CMCS). The duties include: coordinate for the provisioning of symmetric and asymmetric key products to support C4 and C2 systems while work[ing]
in collaboration with communications planners for the development of communications instructions and support for elements of
the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) or other authorized
elements requiring authorized support, provide information regarding new or revised COMSEC policies and procedures and
their impact on the command, train and inspect COMSEC users
within the command, monitors and maintains the command COMSEC material allowances, performs spot checks of users to assess
adherence to prescribed instructions. Also may serve as a Central
Office of Record (COR) Auditor for COMSEC account inspections.
Entry-level input to this MOS may be from any MOS at the grade
of Staff Sergeant.
0689 - Cyber Security Chief
Cyber Security Chiefs are responsible for all aspects of ensuring
Marine Corps information systems data availability, integrity authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. Computer network defense specialists implement and monitor security measures
for USMC communication information systems networks, and advise the commander that systems and personnel adhere to established security standards and governmental requirements for security on these systems. Duties include assisting in the development
and execution of security policies, plans, and procedures; design
and implementation of data network security measures; network
intrusion detections and forensics; information system security
incident handling; and certification of Marine Corps systems and
networks. The skill progression training for Master Gunnery Sergeant through Staff Sergeant is the Information Assurance Managers Course (IAM) and Cyber Security Chiefs Course.
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ENDNOTES – APPENDIX III
1. Officer information was taken verbatim from Marine Corps
Order 1200.17E, Military Occupational Specialties Manual, Washington, DC: Commandant of the Marine Corps, August 8, 2013, available from https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/MCO%201200.17E.
pdf, accessed November 1, 2018. Enlisted information was taken
verbatim from the specific position webpages, see the MOS dropdown under “Find & Select Related Credentials,” Marine Corps
COOL: Credentialing Opportunities On-Line, available from
https://www.cool.navy.mil/usmc/, accessed September 24, 2017.
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APPENDIX IV:
KEY NAVY CYBER-RELATED PERSONNEL
NAVY OFFICER PERSONNEL
1810 - Cryptologic Warfare
. . . directly involved in every aspect of Naval operations—delivering information to decision-makers by attacking, defending and exploiting networks to capitalize on vulnerabilities in the information domain. As a CWO
[Cryptologic Warfare Officer], you will employ a thorough understanding
of sensors and weapons, strategy and tactics, as well as national systems’
capabilities and limitations.1
1820 - Information Professional
. . . plan, acquire, secure, operate and maintain the Naval network and the
systems that support Navy operations and business processes.2
1830 - Intelligence
Supervise the collection, analysis and dissemination of critical information.
. . .Provide intelligence support to US Naval forces and multinational military forces. . . . Advise executive-level decision makers in US government.
. . . Lead Enlisted personnel in gathering and analyzing mission-sensitive
intelligence.3
1840 - Cyber Warfare Engineer
Provide defense against attacks and deliver tactical advantages. Develop
tools and techniques in the information environment that ensure
situational awareness.4
NAVY CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER PERSONNEL
781X (744X) - Information Warfare Technician
. . . serve as officer technical leaders and managers in the field of cryptology,
versed in all facets of Signals Intelligence, Computer Network Operations
and Electronic Warfare. Perform functions of electronic maintenance, communications, CMS [Combat Management System], and technical research
in support of the operating forces and the national cryptologic effort. They
plan and manage the employment of resources, equipment and manpower;
operation and maintenance of electrical, electromechanical equipment and
the conduct of communications, administration of CMS functions.5
782X (742X) - Information Systems Technician
. . . serve as an officer technical specialist in the field of informations [sic]
systems, communications (fixed/mobile) suites, satellite communications
systems, knowledge management and information assurance. They plan
and direct the installation of equipment and administer the operations and
maintenance of data processing installations.6

Table IV-I. Position Title and Description of Key
Navy Cyber-Related Personnel
113

NAVY CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER PERSONNEL
783X (745X) - Intelligence Technician
Serve as an officer technical specialist in the following intelligence discipline: Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Operational Intelligence (OPINTEL), and Carrier Air Wing (CVW) Targeting. They supervise and direct
intelligence personnel in assembling and analyzing HUMINT reports,
multi-source OPINTEL of surface, sub-surface, and air activity and CVW
strike missions in support of intelligence analysis, reporting, and briefing.
Intelligence CWOs [chief warrant officers] supervise and direct intelligence personnel in the following: interviewing and preparation of various
HUMINT reports; preparation of intelligence material utilized in planning
strike and photographic reconnaissance missions; preparation of graphics
including annotated photographs, plot sheets, mosaics and overlays; plotting and preparing multi-sensory imagery and OPINTEL reports; providing input to and receiving data from various computerized intelligence
systems afloat and ashore; and maintenance of intelligence files including
digital photographs, maps, and charts and soft/hard copy libraries.7
784X - Cyber
. . . operate, analyze, plan and direct full-spectrum cyber operations.8
NAVY ENLISTED PERSONNEL
Cryptologic Technician Interpretive (CTI)
CTIs serve as experts in linguistics (including Arabic, Chinese, Korean,
Persian-Farsi, Russian and Spanish) and deciphering information in other
languages. Their responsibilities include:
•
Collecting, analyzing and exploiting foreign language communications of interest
•
Transcribing, translating and interpreting foreign language
materials
•
Providing cultural and regional guidance in support of Navy,
Joint Force, national and multinational needs.9
Cryptologic Technician Maintenance (CTM)
CTMs serve as experts in the preventive and corrective maintenance of sophisticated cryptologic equipment, networks and systems. Their responsibilities include:
•
Installing, testing, troubleshooting, repairing or replacing cryptologic networks, physical security systems, electronic equipment,
antennas, personal computers, auxiliary equipment, digital and
optical interfaces, and data systems
•
Configuring, monitoring and evaluating Information Operations
(IO), Information Warfare (IW) systems and Information Assurance (IA) operations.10
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NAVY ENLISTED PERSONNEL
Cryptologic Technician Networks (CTN)
CTNs serve as experts in communication network defense and forensics.
Their responsibilities include:
•
Monitoring, identifying, collecting and analyzing information
•
Providing computer network risk mitigation and network vulnerability assessments and incident response/reconstruction
•
Providing network target access tool development
•
Conducting computer network operations worldwide in support
of Navy and Department of Defense missions.11
Cryptologic Technician Collection (CTR)
CTRs serve as experts in intercepting signals. Their responsibilities include:
•
Analyzing and reporting on communication signals using computers, specialized computer-assisted communications equipment, video display terminals and electronic/magnetic tape
recorders
•
Exploiting signals of interest to identify, locate and report worldwide threats
•
Providing tactical and strategic signals intelligence, technical
guidance, and information warfare support to surface, subsurface, air and special warfare units.12
Cryptologic Technician Technical (CTT)
CTTs serve as experts in airborne, shipborne and land-based radar signals.
Their responsibilities include:
•
Operating electronic intelligence-receiving and direction-finding
systems, digital recording devices, analysis terminals, and associated computer equipment
•
Operating systems that produce high-power jamming signals
used to deceive electronic sensors and defeat radar-guided weapons systems
•
Providing technical and tactical guidance in support of surface,
subsurface, air and special warfare operations.13
Intelligence Specialist (IS)
Intelligence Specialists play no small part in the success of America’s Navy.
[Their responsibilities include]:
•
Collect, process, analyze, organize and disseminate information
•
Prepare detailed materials that communicate findings
•
And, ultimately, help generate insight that has strategic and tactical implications all over the world.14
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NAVY ENLISTED PERSONNEL
Information Systems Technician (IT)
. . . [ITs] engage in a broad range of responsibilities including network administration, database management and computer hardware and software
implementation. Their responsibilities include:
•
Operating and maintaining Navy global satellite telecommunications systems
•
Serving as admin on mainframe computers and local and wide
area networks
•
Implementing micro-computer systems throughout the Fleet15
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1. See “Responsibilities,” under the “More Information,”
section in “Cryptologic Warfare Careers,” available from https://
www.navy.com/index.php/careers/cryptologic-warfare.
2.

Ibid.

3. See “Responsibilities,” under the “More Information,”
section in “Information Professionals Careers,” available from
https://www.navy.com/careers/information-professional.
4. See “About,” in “Military Intelligence Careers,” available
from https://www.navy.com/careers/military-intelligence.
5.
See “About,” in “Cyber Warfare Engineer Careers,”
available from https://www.navy.com/careers/cyber-warfare-engineer.
6. See “781X - Cryptological Warfare Technician,” under
“CWO DESIGNATOR CAREER PATTERN SHEETS,” Navy Personnel Command, last modified September 6, 2018, available from
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/officer/communitymanagers/
active/ldo_cwo/Pages/Career%20Path%20Sheets.aspx.
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under “CWO DESIGNATOR CAREER PATTERN SHEETS,”
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http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/officer/
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Sheets.aspx.
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See “783X - INTELLIGENCE TECHNICIAN,” under
“CWO DESIGNATOR CAREER PATTERN SHEETS,” Navy Personnel Command, last modified September 6, 2018, available from
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/officer/communitymanagers/
active/ldo_cwo/Pages/Career%20Path%20Sheets.aspx.
9.
See Andrea Perez, “Cyber Warrant Officer Program
Broadens Eligibility,” Navy News, Story Number: NNS13102505, October 25, 2013, available from https://www.navy.mil/submit/
display.asp?story_id=77266, accessed September 24, 2017.
10. See “Responsibilities,” under the “More Information,”
section in “Cryptologic Technician Careers,” available from
https://www.navy.com/index.php/careers/cryptologic-technician.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. See under heading “Intelligence Specialist,” archived
page available from https://web.archive.org/web/20170511000237/
https://www.navy.com/careers/information-and-technology/intelligence-specialist.html#ft-key-responsibilities.
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APPENDIX V:
KEY AIR FORCE CYBER-RELATED
PERSONNEL
AIR FORCE OFFICER PERSONNEL
17DX – Network Operations
17SX – Cyber Warfare Operations
Executes cyberspace operations and information operations
functions and activities. Plans, organizes, directs and executes
cyberspace and information operations such as, Defensive
Cyber Operations (DCO), Offensive Cyber Operations (OCO),
Department of Defense (DoD) Information Network [DODIN]
Operations and Mission Assurance for Air Force weapons systems and platforms. Such operations cover the spectrum of mission areas within the cyberspace domain.1
AIR FORCE ENLISTED PERSONNEL
1B4X1 – Cyberspace Warfare Operations
Performs duties to develop, sustain, and enhance cyberspace
capabilities to defend national interests from attack and to
create effects in cyberspace to achieve national objectives. Conduct Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO) and Defensive
Cyberspace Operations (DCO) using established tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to achieve Service, CCMD, and
national objectives. Executes command and control (C2) of
assigned cyberspace forces and de-conflicts cyberspace operations across the kinetic and non-kinetic spectrum. Supports
cyberspace capability development, testing and implementation. Partners with Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and
Multinational forces to detect, deny or manipulate adversarial
access to sovereign national cyberspace systems.2
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AIR FORCE ENLISTED PERSONNEL
D0X1 – Knowledge Management
Develop, govern, and monitor processes, technologies, and
practices that support organizations to identify, capture, organize, and employ information in both fixed and deployed
environments. These information assets comprise of raw data,
documents, practices, policies, and individual expertise. Core
competencies of Knowledge Managers include: professional networking, social collaboration, Communities of Practice (CoP),
enterprise information systems technology, business continuity, cross-functional data sharing, and process-improvement.3
3D0X2 – Cyber Systems Operations
Installs, supports and maintains server operating systems or
other computer systems and the software applications pertinent
to its operation, while also ensuring current defensive mechanisms are in place (IAVA Patches, etc.), and responding to service
outages and interruptions to network operations. Administers
server-based networked systems, distributed applications, network storage, messaging, and application monitoring required
to provision, sustain, operate and integrate cyber networked
systems and applications in garrison and at deployed locations.
Core competencies include: server operating systems, database administration, web technologies, systems-related project
management and supervising computer operators. Supports
identification, reconnaissance and remediation of vulnerabilities while enhancing capabilities within cyber environments to
achieve desired affects.4
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AIR FORCE ENLISTED PERSONNEL
3D0X3 – Cyber Surety
Performs risk management framework security determinations of fixed, deployed and mobile information systems (IS)
and telecommunications resources to monitor, evaluate and
maintain systems, policy and procedures to protect clients, networks, data/voice systems and databases from unauthorized
activity. Identifies potential threats and manages resolution
of communications security incidents. Enforces national, DoD
and Air Force security policies and directives to ensure Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) of IS resources.
Administers and manages the overall cybersecurity program to
include Communications Security (COMSEC), Emissions Security (EMSEC) and Computer Security (COMPUSEC) programs.5
3D0X4 – Computer Systems Programming
Supervises and performs as computer analyst, coder, tester and
manager in the design, development, maintenance, testing,
configuration management, and documentation of application
software systems, client-server, and web-enabled software and
relational database systems critical to warfighting capabilities.6
3D1X1 – Client Systems
Deploys, sustains, troubleshoots, and repairs standard voice,
data, desktop video and network client devices in fixed and
deployed environments. Sustains and operates systems through
effective troubleshooting, repair, and system performance analysis. Manages client user accounts and organizational client
device accounts.7
3D1X2 – Cyber Transport Systems
Deploys, sustains, troubleshoots, and repairs standard voice,
data, and video network infrastructure systems, IP detection
systems and cryptographic equipment. Performs, coordinates,
integrates, and supervises network design, configuration,
operation, defense, restoration, and improvements. Analyzes
capabilities and performance, identifies problems, and takes
corrective action. Fabricates, terminates, and interconnects
wiring and associated network infrastructure devices.8
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AIR FORCE ENLISTED PERSONNEL
3D1X3 – RF Transmission Systems
Deploys, sustains, troubleshoots, and repairs standard radio frequency wireless, line-of-sight, beyond line-of-sight, wideband,
ground-based satellite, and encryption transmission devices
in a fixed and deployed environment. Included are multiple
waveform systems operating across the spectrum, keying and
signal devices; telemetry and instrumentation systems. Establishes and maintains circuits, configures and manages system
and network connectivity.9
3D1X4 – Spectrum Operations
The Spectrum Operations technician analyzes requirements
and requests frequencies to support terrestrial, aircraft and
space systems and coordinate radio, radar, land, and other electromagnetic radiating or receiving requirements. They possess
a solid understanding of wireless communications systems
technologies and configurations and provide guidance to program offices, developers, and potential users of radiating and
receiving equipment planned for introduction into the Air
Force inventory and for modification to existing equipment.10
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